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This paper deals with the macroeconomics of oil price shocks1 and analyzes the dynamic ef-
fects of anticipated price increases of raw materials imports upon two large open economies.
It is assumed that the domestic and the foreign economy are symmetric on the demand
side but have an asymmetric macroeconomic structure on the supply side. For the pro-
duction of their respective ¯nal good imported inputs are necessary. Both economies are
dependent upon a small third country for raw materials imports (like crude oil). We can
identify the small oil-exporting country with the OPEC nations and the domestic and the
foreign economy with the European Monetary Union and the USA respectively. It is as-
sumed that the dependency upon oil imports is stronger for the domestic than the foreign
economy and that oil imports are priced in terms of the foreign currency (dollars). We then
discuss the dynamic e®ects of anticipated oil price shocks upon several domestic and for-
eign macroeconomic variables like real output, in°ation rate, real interest rate and terms
of trade. The theoretical analysis is motivated by the substantial increase in oil prices
in recent years.2 The discussion is based on a macrodynamic model of two large open
oil-dependent economies. The model stands in the Mundell/Fleming/Dornbusch/Phillips
tradition and generalizes similar models of Bhandari (1981) and Turnovsky (1986) to the
case of large oil-dependent economies. The paper ¯rst analyzes the dynamic e®ects of oil
price shocks, if raw materials imports are denominated in terms of the foreign currency.
We then investigate the impacts of such price increases under alternative currency denom-
ination of oil imports. It is shown that the decision of the OPEC nations to denominate
their oil exports in terms of Euro rather than US dollars reduces the stag°ationary e®ects
of oil price increases upon both the domestic and foreign economy. Besides the discus-
sion of the two polar cases of either foreign- or domestic-currency denominated oil the
paper also analyzes a combination of these cases where a ¯xed proportion of raw materials
imports is priced in dollars while the rest is denominated in terms of Euro.
The paper also investigates the consequences of alternative degrees of wage indexation.
It is analyzed to what extent the dynamic e®ects of oil price shocks depend upon the
wage adjustment scheme in the domestic and the foreign economy. We also discuss the
e®ects of various monetary policy rules that could be employed by the domestic and the
foreign economy in an e®ort to reduce or neutralize the potentially disruptive e®ects of
oil price shocks. In what follows we use the terms oil imports and raw materials imports
interchangeably. The implications of this paper go well beyond the role of imported raw
materials in an open economy. In fact, it can also be applied to all intermediate goods
produced and used for domestic production.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the dynamic model of two large
oil-dependent economies. Section 3 analyzes the dynamic e®ects of anticipated oil price
1An overview is given in Jones, Leiby and Paik (2004).
2The average monthly US dollar price of crude oil (simple average of Dubai, Brent and WTI) has risen from
a low of 10.41 per barrel in December 1998 to a peak of 32.33 per barrel in November 2000. Meanwhile,
the price has fallen to a low of 18.52 US$/bbl in December 2001, to start rising afterwards to an all-time
high of 46.87 US$/bbl in October 2004 (cf. IMF (2004)).
1increases. It is assumed that for both countries oil imports are denominated in terms of
the foreign currency (US dollars). In section 4 the case of domestic-currency denominated
oil is discussed. We analyze the question whether both economies can be better insulated
against oil price shocks if the currency denomination of international raw materials trade
changes from US dollars to Euro. Section 4 also considers a combination of theses two polar
cases. It is assumed that oil imports are denominated in terms of a ¯xed weight basket
of the domestic and foreign currency. Section 5 discusses the consequences of alternative
degrees of wage indexation while section 6 analyzes various monetary policy responses to oil
price shocks. In particular the problem is analyzed whether an international coordination
of monetary policy is able to avoid adjustment dynamics of all endogenous variables, i.e.
to stabilize the macroeconomic variables at their respective steady state level. Section 7
summarizes the main results. At the end the paper includes an extensive mathematical
appendix, where the analytical solution to the dynamic macroeconomic model is presented.
2 The Model
We consider two large open economies which are of equal size in the initial steady state.
Both countries use imported oil from a third small country for the production of their re-
spective domestic outputs. The following notation is employed: Dots denote time deriva-
tives and overbars indicate steady state values. All variables { except for the interest rates
i and i¤ { are logarithmized. Variables with a ¤ describe foreign variables while variables
without ¤ stand for domestic variables. The model is described by the following set of
equations:
q = (a0 + a1y ¡ a2(i ¡ _ pc)) + g + (c0 ¡ c1y + c2y¤ ¡ c3¿) (1)
q¤ = (a0 + a1y¤ ¡ a2(i¤ ¡ _ p¤c)) + g¤ ¡ (c0 ¡ c1y + c2y¤ ¡ c3¿) (2)
¿ = p ¡ (p¤ + e) (3)
m ¡ pc = l0 + l1q ¡ l2i (4)
m¤ ¡ p¤c = l0 + l1q¤ ¡ l2i¤ (5)
i = i¤ + _ e (6)
pc = ®p + (1 ¡ ®)(p¤ + e) (0:5 < ® < 1) (7)
p¤c = ®¤p¤ + (1 ¡ ®¤)(p ¡ e) (0:5 < ®¤ < 1) (8)
y = q ¡ Ã(p¤
R + e ¡ p) ¡ d0 (9)
y¤ = q¤ ¡ Ã¤(p¤
R ¡ p¤) ¡ d0 (10)
_ p = ¹ _ w + (1 ¡ ¹)(_ p¤
R + _ e) (0 < ¹ < 1) (11)
_ p¤ = ¹¤ _ w¤ + (1 ¡ ¹¤)_ p¤
R (0 < ¹¤ < 1) (12)
_ w = ¼ + ±(q ¡ q) (13)
_ w¤ = ¼¤ + ±¤(q¤ ¡ q¤) (14)
2¼ = ¯ _ m + (1 ¡ ¯)_ pc (0 · ¯ · 1) (15)
¼¤ = ¯¤ _ m¤ + (1 ¡ ¯¤)_ p¤c (0 · ¯¤ · 1) (16)
q = f0 + f1¿ + f2(p ¡ (p¤






where q = real output, y = real income, i = nominal interest rate, i¡ _ pc = real interest rate,
g = real government expenditure, p = domestic price of domestic output, ¿ = ¯nal goods
terms of trade, e = nominal exchange rate (domestic currency price of foreign currency),
m = nominal money stock, w = nominal wage rate, pc = consumer price index, ¼ =
augmentation term in the Phillips curve, p¤
R = US dollar price of imported raw materials
or other intermediate goods, p¡(p¤
R+e) = intermediate goods terms of trade, p¤
R+e¡p =
real factor price of imported intermediate goods; a0, c0, d0, l0, f0, f¤
0 = autonomous shift
terms; a1, a2, c1, c2, c3, l1, l2, Ã, Ã¤, ±, ±¤, f1, f¤
1, f2, f¤
2 = positive model parameters
(which can be interpreted as elasticities or semi-elasticities).
Equations (1) and (2) are IS equations and describe goods market equilibrium in the
respective economy. This requires real output to be equal to the sum of real private
absorption (¯rst expression in brackets), real government expenditure and the di®erence
between real exports and imports of ¯nal goods (second expression in brackets). Real
private absorption is assumed to depend positively on income and negatively upon the real
interest rate.3 As in Turnovsky (1986) the real interest rate is computed using the in°ation
rate based on the (rationally anticipated) consumer price index. International trade in
¯nal goods (trade balance without imports of raw materials) depends upon domestic and
foreign income and the ¯nal goods terms of trade (de¯ned in (3)). The IS equations are
assumed symmetric so that in the trade balance c1 = c2 holds and corresponding e®ects
across the two economies are identical.
Equations (4) and (5) are standard equations and re°ect money market equilibrium.
Money demand is assumed to depend on real output rather than real income which is con-
sidered a more appropriate measure of the volume of transactions. We assume symmetric
money demand functions. The nominal money stock is de°ated by the consumer price in-
dex de¯ned in (7) and (8) respectively to allow for the fact that in open economies money
is also used for the purchase of imported goods. Equation (6) is the uncovered interest
parity condition and describes perfect substitutability of domestic and foreign bonds. The
domestic interest rate may deviate only by the rationally anticipated rate of depreciation
_ e from the foreign interest rate.
Equation (9) (and similar (10)) links domestic production with real income or gross
national product. The di®erence between real output and income results from real inter-
mediate imports. Real imports of raw materials (or more generally: intermediate goods)
3In discrete time New Neoclassical New Keynesian synthesis models, private absorption does not only
depend positively on the current income, but also depends positively on past and/or expected future
income (see, for example, Fuhrer and Moore (1995), Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999), King (2000) or
McCallum (2001)). In deterministic continuous time models (like ours) private absorption only depends
on the current income.
3can be expressed in non-logarithmized form as the product of the real price of raw materi-
als (P¤
R¢E=P) and physical imports R (where capital letters refer to natural variables and
imports of raw materials are denominated in terms of the foreign currency). If there is no
possibility of substituting labor or capital for oil in the production process there must be
a proportional relationship between the quantity R and the level of domestic production
Q of the form R = ·Q (0 < · < 1). In this case a logarithmic-linear approximation of
the relationship between the natural variables Y and Q leads to equation (9) where Ã is
of the form ·=(1 ¡ ·) provided that the initial value of the intermediate goods terms of
trade P=(P¤
R ¢E) is normalized to unity. If alternatively a CES production function is as-
sumed which allows for factor substitution between labor and oil, the constant Ã depends
on the elasticity of substitution between the factors of production and upon the share of
imported inputs in aggregate production (Bhandari and Turnovsky, 1984).4 An analogue
equation holds for the relationship between foreign production and foreign income where
the real factor price for oil is now given by p¤
R ¡ p¤. If we identify the foreign economy
with the USA and the domestic economy with the European Monetary Union (EMU) it is
reasonable to assume Ã > Ã¤, i.e. that the dependency on oil imports is greater for EMU
than for the USA.5
The equations (11) and (12) describe price adjustment in the domestic and foreign
economy respectively. In both countries the in°ation rate is determined by a weighted
average of nominal wage in°ation and the rate of change of the domestic price of raw
materials imports. The corresponding weights ¹ and 1 ¡ ¹ re°ect the average share of
wage and raw materials costs respectively in the overall variable costs of a representative
¯rm. The expression 1 ¡ ¹ can be interpreted as a measure of the degree of openness of
the domestic economy on the supply side, while the parameter 1 ¡ ® in the price index
de¯nition (7) re°ects the openness of the domestic economy with respect to the large open
foreign economy on the demand side (Bhandari and Turnovsky, 1984). We assume ® < ®¤
and ¹ < ¹¤ so that the domestic economy has a greater degree of openness both on the
demand and supply side. The equations (11) and (12) are dynamic versions of mark-up
pricing rules which are widely used in applied and theoretical economics (Bhandari, 1981).
Equations (13) and (14) describe the dynamics of wage adjustment which take the
form of an augmented Phillips curve (Buiter and Miller, 1982). The augmentation term
is according to (15) and (16) a ¯xed weight linear combination of the trend and core rate
of in°ation, the ¯rst given by the growth rate of money supply and the second by the
(rationally anticipated) in°ation rate based on the consumer price index.6 In the special
4Now Ã is of the form (1 ¡ ¹)(1 ¡ ¾)=¹ where ¾ is the elasticity of substitution between labor and oil and
where ¹ and 1 ¡ ¹ measure the share of labor and imported inputs in gross output respectively.
5In addition to the oil dependency, i.e. the ratio of net oil imports to GDP, the oil intensity, i.e. the ratio
of oil consumption to GDP, is greater for the EMU than for the USA (Anderton, di Mauro and Moneta
(2004)). Note that our model assumption regarding the dependency of the two large open economies on
imported raw materials produced only by a third small country leads to an identity of these concepts.
6The formulation of the in°ation dynamics can also be interpreted as a special type of a continuous time
hybrid Phillips curve. In a discrete time model, the hybrid Phillips curve formulation allows in°ation to
depend on expected future and lagged in°ation (see, for example, Gali and Gertler (1999)). Instead of a
backward-looking element in the hybrid Phillips curve, we model a dependency of the in°ation dynamics
on the trend in°ation rate given by the growth rate of money supply.
4case ¯ = 1 and a given growth rate of money supply the wage adjustment mechanism
is consistent with nominal wage rigidity (van der Ploeg, 1990). In the other polar case
¯ = 0 the growth rate of the real wage rate _ w ¡ _ pc only depends on the output gap q ¡ q
so that real wage rigidity occurs if the parameter ± equals zero. We assume asymmetric
wage adjustment dynamics across the two large open economies. In the EMU the degree
of wage indexation is typically greater than in the USA; we therefore assume ¯ < ¯¤ (cf.
Manasse, 1991, OECD, 2000).
The last two equations (17) and (18) describe long run aggregate supply functions.
In the long run, assuming labor market equilibrium where labor demand is a negative
function of the producer and labor supply a positive function of the consumer real wage
rate and, in addition, assuming a perfectly elastic raw materials supply, output supply
depends positively on the ¯nal and intermediate goods terms of trade.7 Since the domestic
economy is assumed stronger oil-dependent than the foreign economy the parameter f2 is
typically greater than f¤
2.
In the following we will show that as a result of the assumed asymmetries on the supply
side anticipated oil price increases generate adjustment dynamics and steady state e®ects
which di®er considerably across the two economies. In particular it will be demonstrated
that in the long run the stag°ationary e®ects of oil price shocks are stronger for the
domestic than for the foreign economy.
The dynamic behaviour of the complete world system (1)-(18) can be described by a
third-order dynamic system. In the case of positive growth rates of domestic and foreign
money supply the dynamics of the system can be summarized conveniently in terms of
real liquidity and real competitiveness (Buiter and Miller, 1982). According to the decom-
position method by Aoki (1981) and its generalization by Fukuda (1993) we use the state
variables ls, ld and ¿, where
ls = (m ¡ p) + (m¤ ¡ p¤); ld = (m ¡ p) ¡ (m¤ ¡ p¤) (19)
Both the sum and the di®erence of domestic and foreign real liquidity are backward-
looking or predetermined variables (containing the sluggish price variables p and p¤), while
the terms of trade ¿ is a forward-looking or jump variable which moves discontinuously
whenever the nominal exchange rate jumps. Note that the in°ation rates _ p and _ p¤ are
jump variables as well that can adjust instantaneously although the adjustment of wages
and prices is sluggish. The state space representation of the model and the solution time
path of the state vector (ls;ld;¿)0 are provided in the mathematical appendix. In general
it is not possible to decompose the dynamics of the whole system into an aggregate and a
di®erence system wich can be solved independently.8 Nevertheless, the state space form of
7A more detailed theoretical derivation of the role of the terms of trade in aggregate supply is given in
Devereux and Purvis (1990). The supply equations (17) and (18) can also be derived by assuming long
run static price and wage equations of the form p = ¹w + (1 ¡ ¹)(p
¤
R + e), p
¤ = ¹
¤w
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8This is only the case if the supply side of the world system is symmetric (Ã = Ã
¤, ¹ = ¹
¤).
5the model exhibits saddle point stability. The system matrix has a positive determinant
and the number of stable eigenvalues (two) coincides with the number of predetermined
state variables (cf. Buiter, 1984, Turnovsky, 2000).9 In the following we assume that at
time t = 0 the world economy is in steady state. At time 0 a once-and-for-all increase in
the price of imported raw materials (dp¤
R > 0) is anticipated to take e®ect at some future
time T > 0. For example, we can assume that the OPEC credibly announces in t = 0 a
permanent price increase of crude oil to happen at the future date T > 0. The following
chapter discusses the dynamic e®ects of such an oil price shock upon the EMU and the
USA. In particular, the anticipation e®ects of announced oil price increases are analyzed.
3 Dynamic E®ects of an Oil Price Increase
We ¯rst consider the long run or steady state e®ects of a unit increase in the dollar
price of OPEC oil, p¤
R.10 The steady state e®ects of this disturbance result from the
equilibrium condition _ ¿ = 0 = _ ls = _ ld for the state space representation of the dynamics
of the world system. The equilibrium condition implies that in line with monetarism
the long run producer and consumer price in°ation as well as the rate of depreciation _ e
are only determined by the rate of domestic and foreign monetary growth (_ p = _ pc = _ m,
_ p¤ = _ p¤c = _ m¤, _ e = _ m¡ _ m¤). This implies that an oil price shock of the form dp¤
R > 0 can
only cause temporary in°ation in the domestic and foreign economy. On the other hand, a
rise in the price of oil leads to a permanent change in the level of the state variables ¿, ls and
ld. If we assume that the nominal money stock is constant in both economies ( _ m = _ m¤ = 0)
the foreign price shock leads to a permanent increase in domestic producer price level
(dp > 0) which is stronger than the rise in foreign price level (dp > dp¤). This implies that
there is a fall both in the steady state level of aggregate real money stock (dl
s
< 0) and
the real money stock di®erential (dl
d
< 0) and a reduction in domestic real money supply
which is stronger than the decrease in foreign real money stock (d(m ¡ p) < d(m¤ ¡ p¤)).11
Correspondingly, the nominal exchange rate, i.e. the domestic currency price of foreign
currency, increases in the long run (de > 0). Under the fairly weak necessary and su±cient
condition
(1 ¡ a1 + 2c1)(f2 ¡ f¤
2) > (a1 ¡ 2c1)(Ã ¡ Ã¤) (20)
the long run rise in the price di®erential p¡p¤ is greater than the steady state depreciation
of the domestic currency so that the domestic ¯nal goods terms of trade ¿(= p ¡ p¤ ¡ e)
9Note that the stable eigenvalues of the system decrease in absolute terms if the degree of supply-side
openness (i.e., 1¡¹) increases. For very large (empirically irrelevant) values of 1¡¹ the number of stable
eigenvalues is smaller than the number of predetermined state variables so that the saddle point stability
gets lost (cf. Turnovsky (2000), p. 147 (Proposition 5.3)).




0 is denoted by x0, the new steady state by x1.
11The decline of the equilibrium real money stock implies in isolation a rise in the steady state value of
the nominal interest rate. Since in long run equilibrium i = i
;¤ + _ m ¡ _ m
¤ and (i ¡ _ pc) ¡ (i ¡ _ p¤c) =
(1 ¡ (® + ®
¤))_ ¿ = 0 holds, it follows that the long run change of all nominal and real interest rates
coincides if there is no monetary growth (i.e., _ m = _ m
¤ = 0). Several numerical simulations show that the
oil price shock causes an increase in the equilibrium values of domestic and foreign interest rate. For large
values of the interest-rate semi-elasticity of money demand l2 the increase in i and i
¤ is weak.
6permanently increase (d¿ > 0). Generally, the steady state e®ect of the price shock
dp¤
R > 0 on the domestic terms of trade ¿ is not uniquely determined. This can be
illustrated in a ¿=(q ¡ q¤)-diagram (cf. ¯gure 1) which contains the di®erence of the long
run IS equations (IS ¡ IS
¤), i.e.
(1 ¡ a1 + 2c1)(q ¡ q¤) = ¡(2c3 ¡ (a1 ¡ 2c1)Ã)¿ + 2c0
+ g ¡ g¤ ¡ (a1 ¡ 2c1)(Ã ¡ Ã¤)(p¤
R ¡ p¤) (21)
and the corresponding di®erence of the long run aggregate supply functions (AS ¡ AS
¤),
i.e.
q ¡ q¤ = f0 ¡ f¤
0 + (f1 + f¤
1 + f2)¿ ¡ (f2 ¡ f¤
2)(p¤
R ¡ p¤) (22)
The demand-side equilibrium curve IS ¡ IS
¤ has a negative slope provided that 2c3 >
(a1¡2c1)Ã holds.12 On the other hand, the supply-side curve AS¡AS
¤ is positively sloped
in ¿=(q ¡ q¤)-space. Since an increase in the US dollar price of imported raw materials is
t
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Figure 1: Steady state e®ects of the input-price increase
accompanied by a less than equivalent rise in the equilibrium foreign price level (dp¤
R > dp¤)
the long run foreign real price of raw materials inputs rises (d(p¤
R ¡ p¤) > 0). Due to our
assumptions Ã > Ã¤, f2 > f¤
2 this induces a shift both of the demand and supply curve
to the left (see ¯gure 1).13 If inequality (20) holds the long run supply curve AS ¡ AS
¤
moves further to the left than the long run demand curve IS ¡ IS
¤. In this case a long
run real appreciation of the domestic currency occurs (d¿ > 0) although the nominal
exchange rate permanently increases (de > 0). Figure 1 also illustrates that irrespective
of the sign of the change of domestic ¯nal goods terms of trade there is always a fall in
12Note that the assumption of a normal reaction of the domestic trade balance against the USA to changes
in the ¯nal goods terms of trade ¿ (i.e., c3 > 0) is not su±cient for a negative slope, since an increase in ¿
raises due to y = q +Ã¿ ¡Ã(p
¤
R ¡p
¤)¡d0 national income and domestic private absorption holding other
factors constant.
13The curve IS ¡ IS
¤
moves to the left since the rise in p¤
R ¡ p¤ leads to a stronger reduction in domestic
than in foreign income and absorption respectively.
7the long run output di®erential q¡q¤ so that dq < dq¤ holds. Under the weak assumption
(20) the increase in the price of imported raw materials leads to a permanent reduction in
foreign output (dq¤ < 0). Therefore, domestic real output also falls in the long run, and
the output contraction is stronger in the domestic than in the foreign economy.14 The
intuitive reason is that the domestic economy is stronger oil-dependent than the foreign
economy and that oil imports are priced in terms of the foreign currency (dollars). Due
to the nominal depreciation of the domestic currency, the oil price shock dp¤
R > 0 must
have stronger negative e®ects on the supply side of the domestic economy than upon the
foreign economy.
As yet we have shown that in the long run a rise in the dollar-price of imported crude oil
has stronger stag°ationary e®ects in the EMU than in the USA and that the equilibrium
nominal depreciation of the Euro is typically accompanied by a real appreciation of the
domestic currency.15 Although the increase in the steady state value of the terms of
trade ¿ worsens the domestic real trade balance against the US, the stronger reduction
of national than foreign income (dy < dy¤) in isolation leads to an improvement of the
domestic equilibrium trade balance against the US so that the net e®ect is ambiguous.
If the negative terms of trade e®ect on the domestic trade balance is not too large, the
trade balance against the large foreign country improves.16 A similar result holds if the
equilibrium trade balance with respect to OPEC is considered. In logarithmic terms, the
steady state change of domestic real imports of raw materials (dimR) is given by
dimR = dq + (1 ¡ ¾)d(p¤
R + e ¡ p) (23)
where ¾ is the elasticity of substitution between labor and oil.17 While the domestic
output contraction leads to an equivalent fall in imR the rise in the real factor price of
oil increases real raw materials imports. The net e®ect is therefore ambiguous in sign.18
Several numerical simulations with realistic parameter values19 illustrate that the output
e®ect dominates the opposite real factor price e®ect so that dimR is negative in general.20
This implies that the equilibrium trade balance with respect to OPEC typically improves
14This result also holds in the case d¿=dp
¤
R < 0. Due to the relationship p
¤
R ¡ p
¤ = ¿ + (p
¤
R + e ¡ p) the rise
in the long run foreign real price of oil (p¤
R ¡ p¤) is stronger (weaker) than the rise of the corresponding
domestic real factor price (p¤
R + e ¡ p) if d¿=dp
¤







and Ã > Ã
¤, there is also a fall in the equilibrium income di®erential (d(y ¡ y¤) < 0). Note that the degree
of output contraction strongly depends on the degree of oil-dependency of the economies. An increase in
the degree of supply-side openness (i.e., a rise in 1 ¡ ¹) leads to a tightening of the contractionary output
e®ects (cf. Bhandari and Turnovsky (1984)). Moreover, the in°ationary e®ects due to the oil price shock
are weaker but more persistent, if the degree of supply-side openness rises. See, for example, Romer (1993)
for a general discussion of the openness-in°ation relationship.
15Similar results for small open economies can be found in Bhandari (1981) and Bhandari and Turnovsky
(1984).
16In Bhandari (1981) it is assumed that the terms of trade e®ect dominates the income e®ect so that the
real trade balance with respect to the USA is worsened.
17In Bhandari and Turnovsky (1984) ¾ is equal to 0:33 while in Bhandari (1981) ¾ = 0. Since real exports
of the domestic economy with respect to OPEC are negligible by assumption, the steady state change of
the trade balance with respect to OPEC equals ¡dimR.
18Cf. Bhandari (1981).
19See footnote 37 for the parameter values used for numerical simulations of the model.
20The same holds for dim
¤
R, i.e. the steady state change of foreign real imports of raw materials.
8so that the same holds for the overall trade balance of the domestic economy.21
Let us now consider the dynamic e®ects of an anticipated increase in the foreign price
of raw materials imports for both the domestic and the foreign economy. If the OPEC
credibly announces at t = 0 that at some future date T the price of crude oil will be raised,
this on impact leads to a fall in the domestic ¯nal goods terms of trade ¿, i.e. an immediate
real and nominal depreciation of the domestic currency (cf. ¯gure 2 at the end of this
section).22 After the initial jump the process of depreciation continues to hold during the
entire period between the announcement and the implementation of the oil price increase.
This is accompanied by a gradual rise in the domestic and a gradual fall in the foreign
price level (¯gure 3). The divergent responses of domestic and foreign price level can be
explained by the immediate domestic output increase and foreign output decrease which
cause temporary wage and price in°ation in the domestic and wage and price de°ation
in the foreign economy (¯gure 4). During the anticipation phase 0 < t < T the increase
in the price di®erential p ¡ p¤ is weaker than the rise in the nominal exchange rate e so
that the terms of trade ¿ fall until the input price shock actually occurs. The exogenous
price shock leads to a stronger rise of domestic than foreign price level and a reversal
in the development of ¿, i.e. a process of real appreciation which is accompanied by a
further nominal devaluation of the domestic currency. During the course of adjustment,
for su±ciently large t > T, a delayed overshooting of ¿, e and p ¡ p¤ takes place so that
these variables have a hump-shaped adjustment for t > T and converge from above to their
respective new steady state level (cf. ¯gure 2).23 The announcement of a future oil price
increase and the resulting real depreciation of the domestic currency on impact lead to a
rise in domestic and a fall in foreign output so that the output di®erential q¡q¤ is positive
in the short run. This is accompanied by a positive di®erence of the income variables y
and y¤ (¯gure 5).24 Thereafter, both di®erence variables start to decrease and change sign
during the course of adjustment (i.e., q < q¤ and y < y¤ for t su±ciently large). After
its initial increase domestic output begins to fall (¯gure 5). The reason is the rise of the
domestic real factor price p¤
R + e ¡ p throughout the entire anticipation period (¯gure 6),
which { in isolation { reduces national income and private absorption. In addition, the rise
of the in°ation rate based on the consumer price index, _ pc, is connected with a stronger
increase of domestic nominal interest rate so that the domestic real interest rate also
starts to increase after its initial fall (cf. ¯gure 7) leading to a further reduction of private
absorption. During the entire period between the announcement and the implementation
of the oil price increase both the rise of the domestic real interest rate and domestic
21Several numerical simulations illustrate that there is also an improvement of the overall trade balance
of the large foreign economy, although its bilateral trade balance with respect to the domestic economy
deteriorates in general.
22The intuitive reason for the immediate rise of e is the stronger oil-dependency of the domestic economy.
The public therefore expects that the domestic economy will be stronger hit by the oil price hike than the
foreign economy.
23A delayed overshooting of exchange rates in response to monetary policy shocks was empirically found by,
for example, Eichenbaum and Evans (1995).
24On impact, there is also a discontinuous decrease in the real interest rates i ¡ _ p
c and i
¤ ¡ _ p
c¤. Although
the instantaneous reduction of the domestic real interest rate is smaller than the fall of the corresponding
foreign variable, the output di®erential q ¡ q
¤ increases on impact.
9real price of imported raw materials is stronger than the change of the corresponding
foreign variables.25 After the initial jump domestic output decreases therefore stronger
than foreign output.26
At the date of implementation the increase of the nominal factor price leads to an
equivalent rise of both the domestic and foreign real factor price (¯gure 6).27 Since the
domestic economy is { by assumption { stronger oil-dependent than the foreign economy,
the domestic output contraction at time T is greater than the corresponding foreign output
reduction.28 For t > T both output and income variables converge from above to their new
(smaller) steady state levels (¯gure 5). Note that the contractionary real e®ects during the
entire period after the implementation of the oil price increase are stronger for the domestic
than the foreign economy. The same holds for the domestic and foreign price e®ects after
time T. For any t > T both the domestic price level p and price index pc lie above
their corresponding foreign price variables p¤ and p¤c respectively (¯gure 3). This implies
that for t > T the stag°ationary e®ects are stronger in the domestic than in the foreign
economy. On the other hand, stag°ationary outcomes in the sense of simultaneous output
contraction and price increases do not occur during the anticipation phase. Domestic
output rises on impact and lies above its initial steady state level in the short run. In
the foreign economy a disin°ationary process takes place throughout the time interval
0 < t < T. A rise of the foreign price level only occurs after the implementation of the oil
price increase.
Figure 8 illustrates the dynamic adjustment of domestic and foreign real oil imports.
On impact, a rise in domestic real output and the domestic real factor price of oil takes
place. On the other hand, foreign output is reduced on impact while the foreign real factor
price initially remains constant. According to the import equations
imR = q + (1 ¡ ¾)(p¤
R + e ¡ p) (24)
im¤
R = q¤ + (1 ¡ ¾¤)(p¤
R ¡ p¤) (25)
this implies an increase in domestic real raw materials imports imR while foreign real oil
imports im¤
R decrease on impact. Since domestic real output is greater than its initial
steady state level during the whole anticipation period and the real factor price p¤
R +e¡p




¤))_ ¿ is positive since ®+®
¤ > 1






While both the domestic and foreign real factor price increase during the entire anticipation period, the
development of domestic and foreign real interest rate is of opposite direction. The foreign real interest
rate i
¤ ¡ _ p
¤c decreases for 0 < t < T. Similar results hold for corresponding nominal variables. During
the anticipation period 0 < t < T the domestic price and wage in°ation rates _ p, _ p
c and _ w as well as the
nominal interest rate i rise while the corresponding foreign variables fall.
26It is assumed that the terms of trade elasticity of the trade balance, c3, is not too large, since otherwise q¡q
¤
could rise for 0 < t < T. Note that for small values of the degree of supply-side openness a discontinuous
increase in domestic and foreign output is possible at time T. This result holds since domestic and foreign
real interest rate fall in T.
27It is assumed that the nominal exchange rate e only jumps at the date of anticipation.
28This result holds although domestic and foreign real interest rate decrease at time T discontinuously, and
the fall of domestic real interest rate is larger than the fall of the corresponding foreign variable. If the
degree of supply-side openness is small, a rise of real output at time T is possible.





R) although there is a moderate increase of the foreign real oil
price p¤
R ¡p¤ due to the fall of the foreign price level p¤. The oil price shock in T leads to
an equivalent rise in the real factor prices p¤
R + e ¡ p and p¤
R ¡ p¤ so that imR and im¤
R
rise sharply in T.29 This result holds although real output decreases in T. For t > T the
real factor prices and the output variables fall continuously leading to a gradual decline of
domestic and foreign raw materials imports. At the end of the adjustment process imR and
im¤
R lie below their respective initial steady state level implying a long run improvement of
the domestic and foreign trade balance with respect to OPEC. This result holds although
there is a steady state rise in the real factor price of oil. The long run output contraction
has a stronger (negative) e®ect on real oil imports than the opposing e®ect of the factor
price increase. The realization of a once-and-for-all increase of the oil price only leads to
a temporary rise of real oil imports of the EMU and the USA from the OPEC nations.
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Figure 2: Response of nominal exchange rate e (dotted line) and terms of trade ¿ to an antic-
ipated oil price shock (solid line) during the time span 0 < t < T = 1 (left) and for t > T = 1
(right)
29Note that the jump in T does not depend on the value of T. This is a general result which holds for any
jump variable of the whole model.
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Figure 3: Response of domestic price level p (solid line), foreign price level p¤ (dashed line)
and price di®erential p ¡ p¤ to an anticipated oil price shock, initial steady state p0 = p¤
0 (dotted
line)
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Figure 4: Response of domestic in°ation rate _ p, consumer price in°ation rate _ pc and wage in°ation
rate _ w (solid lines) and foreign in°ation rate _ p¤, consumer price in°ation rate _ p¤c and wage
in°ation rate _ w¤ (dashed lines) to an anticipated oil price shock , initial steady states (dotted
lines)
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Figure 5: Response of domestic output q and income y (solid lines), foreign output q¤ and income
y¤ (dashed lines) as well as output and income di®erential q ¡ q¤ and y ¡ y¤ to an anticipated
oil price shock, initial steady states (dotted lines)
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Figure 6: Response of domestic real factor price p¤
R + e ¡ p (solid line) and foreign real factor
price p¤
R ¡ p¤ (dashed line) to an anticipated oil price shock, initial steady state (dotted line)
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Figure 7: Response of domestic real interest rate i¡ _ pc (solid line) and foreign real interest rate
i ¡ _ p¤c (dashed line) to an anticipated oil price shock, initial steady state (dotted line)
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Figure 8: Response of domestic real oil imports imR (solid line) and foreign real oil imports
im¤
R (dashed line) to an anticipated oil price shock, initial steady state (dotted line)
154 Domestic-Currency Denominated Oil Imports
This section investigates the consequences of an increase of the price of crude oil imports
being denominated in terms of domestic rather than foreign currency. The real domestic
factor price of imported raw materials is now de¯ned by pR¡p where pR is the exogenously
given input price denominated in terms of Euro. The corresponding foreign real factor
price of oil is given by pR ¡ e ¡ p¤. An anticipated increase in the (domestic-currency)
price of imported raw materials in qualitative terms generally has the same steady state
e®ects as in section 3 (i.e. long run stag°ation in both economies coupled with a long run
rise in the nominal exchange and interest rate and the domestic terms of trade ¿).
Several numerical simulations with plausible parameter values show that the steady
state multipliers of an increase in pR with respect to the real and nominal variables q,
q¤, y, y¤, p, p¤, pc, p¤c, i and i¤ are smaller (in absolute terms) than the corresponding
multipliers of a rise in p¤
R.30 This implies that with domestic-currency denominated oil
the long run stag°ationary e®ects upon both economies are reduced.31 If we identify the
domestic economy with the EMU and the foreign economy with the USA we can say that
both the EMU and the USA are better insulated against OPEC price shocks if oil imports
are denominated in Euro rather than US dollars. Moreover, the rise in the equilibrium
nominal exchange rate e and the domestic terms of trade ¿ as well as the rise in the
domestic and foreign real factor price of imported raw materials is weakened.32 Since
the long run output e®ect upon the steady state value of real oil imports dominates the
opposing real factor price e®ect there is a long run reduction of real raw materials imports
which is smaller when oil imports are priced in Euro rather than US dollars. This result
holds for both the domestic and the foreign economy. The improvement of the bilateral
trade balances of the domestic and foreign economy with respect to OPEC is therefore
weakened.
Figure 9 at the end of the section shows the domestic and foreign output adjustment
if imported raw materials are denominated in terms of domestic currency. Each ¯gure
also contains the output time path in case of foreign-currency denominated oil. With
domestic-currency denominated oil the positive impact e®ect on domestic output q is
reduced. The real depreciation of the domestic currency is now smaller, and the domestic
real interest rate does not decrease but increases on impact.33 After its initial jump
real output q continues to rise during the entire anticipation period while it falls if oil
imports are denominated in terms of US dollars. The reason for the opposite adjustment






0 in absolute terms is considerably greater than the corresponding determinant in case of
foreign-currency denominated oil imports.
31Cf. Bhandari (1981) for small open economies.
32Although dpj(D) > dpj(E) and dp
¤j(D) > dp
¤j(E) holds (where D and E denote the Dollar and Euro regime
respectively), the steady state rise in the nominal exchange rate e leads to d(p¤
R + e ¡ p)j(D) > d(pR ¡ p)j(E)
and d(p¤
R ¡ p¤)j(D) > d(pR ¡ e ¡ p¤)j(E). Since the long run output supply according to (11) and (12) is





it follows that in absolute terms jdqj(D) > jdqj(E) and jdq
¤j(D) > jdq
¤j(E).
33On the other hand, the domestic real factor price pR ¡ p is now constant on impact (leaving private
absorption unchanged) while with foreign-currency denominated oil p
¤
R + e ¡ p rises on impact.
16of q during the anticipation period is the di®erent adjustment of the domestic real factor
price. If oil imports are priced in Euro, the real factor price pR ¡ p falls during the
entire anticipation phase leading to a rise in national income and private absorption.
With foreign-currency denominated oil just the opposite holds. The same arguments can
be applied to the behavior of foreign output. After its initial (negative) jump which is
greater in case of domestic-currency denominated oil, q¤ behaves like q, i.e. increases
until time T.34 At the time T of the oil price increase and thereafter the adjustment of q
and q¤ is in qualitative terms the same as with foreign-currency denominated oil. After
the discontinuous contraction at time T, the output variables q and q¤ continue to fall.
If the time span T between the anticipation and the realization of the oil price shock is
su±ciently large then for any t > T, q and q¤ lie above their corresponding values in the
case of foreign-currency denominated oil.35
Now we consider the development of the in°ation rates, _ p and _ p¤ (¯gure 9). With
domestic-currency denominated oil, the direct e®ect of the rate of depreciation _ e on the
domestic in°ation rate _ p vanishes (cf. equation (11)). On the other hand, the dynamic
foreign price equation (12) now contains the term _ pR¡ _ e (instead of _ p¤
R). Since _ e is positive
throughout the entire anticipation phase it is obvious that for 0 < t < T the in°ation rate
in the domestic economy is reduced while the de°ationary process in the foreign economy
is reinforced.36 At the date of implementation the discontinuous increase of both _ p and _ p¤
is now smaller than with foreign-currency denominated oil. For t > T the in°ation rates
_ p and _ p¤ gradually decrease where the fall is slower than with US dollar denominated
oil. This implies that for su±ciently large, but ¯nite t > T the in°ation rates in the case
of domestic-currency denominated oil may be slightly greater than with foreign-currency
denominated oil (¯gure 9). On the other hand, for any t > T the continuous increase
of both the domestic and foreign price level after the implementation of the input price
shock is weakened if oil imports are priced in Euro (¯gure 10).
As yet we have discussed the international e®ects of oil price shocks if either oil imports
are completely priced in US dollars or in Euro. We have shown that OPEC¶s decision to
denominate their oil exports in terms of Euro rather than US dollars has the consequence
that both the EMU and the USA are better insulated against oil price increases. The
question arises whether a combination of these two polar cases may lead to a further
reduction of the stag°ationary e®ects of oil price disturbances.
If ° measures the share of imported raw materials imports which are denominated
34Note that the impact e®ect upon the output di®erential q¡q
¤ is again positive, but smaller compared with
foreign-currency denominated oil. The di®erential output now continues to increase after its initial jump
while it falls during the entire anticipation phase if crude oil is priced in dollars. The reason is that with
domestic-currency denominated oil the output di®erential q ¡ q
¤ is a negative function of the domestic
real factor price pR ¡ p which falls for 0 < t < T since p rises during the entire anticipation period. The
opposite holds if oil imports are priced in dollars. In this case q ¡ q
¤ is a negative function of the foreign
real factor price p
¤
R ¡ p
¤ which rises for 0 < t < T due to the de°ationary process in the foreign economy
during this time span.
35If T is su±ciently small then for small values of t > T qj(D) > qj(E) and q
¤j(D) > q
¤j(E) holds. This is
especially the case if T = 0, i.e., if the oil price shock is not anticipated.
36Analogous results hold for the domestic variables _ p




17in terms of dollars and 1 ¡ ° measures the share of domestic-currency denominated oil
imports, then the dynamic price equations are of the following form:
_ p = ¹ _ w + (1 ¡ ¹)
¡
°(_ p¤
R + _ e) + (1 ¡ °)_ pR
¢
(26)
_ p¤ = ¹ _ w¤ + (1 ¡ ¹¤)
¡
°¤ _ p¤
R + (1 ¡ °¤)(_ pR ¡ _ e)
¢
(27)
where 0 · °;°¤ · 1. The income equations (9) and (10) now contain the real factor price
combination °(p¤
R + e ¡ p) + (1 ¡ °)(pR ¡ p) and °¤(p¤
R ¡ p¤) + (1 ¡ °¤)(pR ¡ e ¡ p¤)
respectively. The same holds for the long run aggregate supply functions (17), (18).
Tables 1 to 4 show the steady state e®ects of a simultaneous increase of the Dollar
and Euro price of imported raw materials (dp¤
R = dpR = 1) with respect to domestic and
foreign real output and the price index for alternative combinations of ° and °¤.37 In each
table the ¯rst column contains the values of °¤ while the ¯rst row contains alternative
values of °. It is obvious that for each of the four tables the minimum value (in absolute
terms) is attained in case ° = °¤ = 0, i.e.38
jdxj(°;°¤)=(0;0) < jdxj(°;°¤)6=(0;0) for x 2 fq;q¤;pc;pc¤g (28)
This implies that for both large open economies the long run stag°ationary e®ects of
materials price increases are minimized if all imports of raw materials or other intermediate
goods are completely denominated in terms of Euro. Moreover, in this case the steady
state increase of the domestic and foreign overall trade balance, which results from the
long run reduction of real raw materials imports, is smallest. The reason is that for both
economies the steady state decline in real oil imports is minimized if ° = °¤ = 0. There
exists no combination of ° and °¤ for which the steady state change of raw materials
imports is positive. Note that similar statements concerning the impact and short-run
e®ects cannot be made.
On impact, the domestic output expansion is reduced if oil imports are priced in Euro,
while foreign output contraction is reinforced.39 After the impact phase up to time T there
is a continuous increase of q and q¤ if (°;°¤) = (0;0), i.e., if oil imports are completely
denominated in terms of Euro. On the other hand, during this time span there is a
37The simulations are based on the parameter values a1 = 0:8, a2 = 1:0, c1 = 0:2, c3 = 0:3, ® = 0:75,
®
¤ = 0:8, l1 = 1, l2 = 1:5, ¹ = 0:7, ¹
¤ = 0:8, ¾ = ¾
¤ = 0:3, Ã = (1 ¡ ¹)(1 ¡ ¾)=¹ = 0:3, Ã




¤ = 0:175, ± = ±
¤ = 0:2, f1 = (1 ¡ ®)=± = 1:25, f
¤
1 = (1 ¡ ®
¤)=±
¤ = 1, f2 = (1 ¡ ¹)=(¹±) = 2:14286,
f
¤
2 = (1 ¡ ¹
¤)=(¹
¤±
¤) = 1:29, ¯ = 0:2, ¯
¤ = 0:8.
38Inequality (28) also holds for x 2 fy;p;p
¤;i;i
¤g. It does not hold for x = y
¤. In this case the minimum
value of jdy
¤j is reached if (°;°
¤) = (1;0) (i.e. if domestic (foreign) oil imports are completely priced in





¤) + (1 ¡ °
¤)(pR ¡ e ¡ p
¤) is smallest if (°;°
¤) = (1;0). For the corresponding domestic factor
price combination °(p
¤
R + e ¡ p) + (1 ¡ °)(pR ¡ p) the weakest rise is given if (°;°
¤) = (0;1), while the
greatest increase is attained if (°;°
¤) = (1;0). Since the same holds for the steady state change of the
¯nal goods terms of trade ¿, the minimum value of jdqj (jdq
¤j) is generally not attained if (°;°
¤) = (0;1)
((°;°
¤) = (1;0)). From an empirical point of view the combinations (0;1) and (1;0) are irrelevant.
39The numerical simulation shows that the immediate increase of q takes its maximum value in case (°;°
¤) =
(1;1). The minimum value of q at time t = 0 is attained if (°;°
¤) = (0;0). Just the opposite holds for
the short run decrease of q
¤. It is minimized if (°;°
¤) = (1;1) and maximized if (°;°
¤) = (0;0). Similar
results hold for the domestic and foreign in°ation rates _ p
c, _ p, _ p
c¤ and _ p
¤.
18contractionary process in both economies if (°;°¤) = (1;1) (cf. ¯gure 9). Thus, if the
anticipation period (0;T) is su±ciently long then for su±ciently large t < T the output
variables q and q¤ in case (°;°¤) = (0;0) must lie above their corresponding values in case
(°;°¤) = (1;1). Because of this it is obvious that if a ¯xed proportion of oil imports is
denominated in terms of US dollars and the other part in terms of Euro, and the time
span between the anticipation and the implementation of the oil price shock is su±ciently
small, then the output development in both economies must throughout the anticipation
phase lie between the polar cases (°;°¤) = (1;1) and (°;°¤) = (0;0) (cf. ¯gure 9 where the
case (°;°¤) = (0:5;0:5) is illustrated). Similar results hold for the domestic and foreign
price variables and the in°ation rates.
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Figure 9: Response of domestic output q and in°ation rate _ p and foreign output q¤ and in°ation
rate _ p¤ to an anticipated oil price shock for domestic-currency denominated oil (dotted lines),
foreign-currency denominated oil (solid lines) and for the case ° = °¤ = 0:5 (dashed lines)
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Figure 10: Response of domestic price level p, domestic consumer price index pc, foreign price
level p¤ and foreign consumer price index p¤c to an anticipated oil price shock for domestic-currency
denominated oil (dotted lines), foreign-currency denominated oil (solid lines) and for the case
° = °¤ = 0:5 (dashed lines)
21Steady state change of domestic output
°¤n° 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
0.0 -0.599297 -0.600651 -0.601872 -0.602979 -0.603987
0.25 -0.605052 -0.606179 -0.607189 -0.608098 -0.608922
0.5 -0.611679 -0.612496 -0.613221 -0.613871 -0.614455
0.75 -0.619393 -0.619782 -0.620125 -0.620429 -0.620701
1.0 -0.628485 -0.628281 -0.628103 -0.627947 -0.627809
Table 1: Steady state e®ects of dp¤
R = dpR = 1 with respect to q for alternative combinations of
° and °¤
Steady state change of foreign output
°¤n° 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
0.0 -0.522044 -0.527387 -0.532206 -0.536574 -0.540551
0.25 -0.522357 -0.528039 -0.533128 -0.537712 -0.541862
0.5 -0.522717 -0.528783 -0.534173 -0.538995 -0.543332
0.75 -0.523137 -0.529642 -0.53537 -0.540452 -0.544992
1 -0.523632 -0.530644 -0.536753 -0.542123 -0.54688
Table 2: Steady state e®ects of dp¤
R = dpR = 1 with respect to q¤ for alternative combinations of
° and °¤
Steady state change of domestic consumer price index
°¤n° 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
0.0 0.672089 0.673949 0.675625 0.677145 0.678528
0.25 0.678159 0.679808 0.681284 0.682614 0.683818
0.5 0.685149 0.686503 0.687706 0.688781 0.689749
0.75 0.693285 0.694226 0.695054 0.695789 0.696446
1.0 0.702875 0.703234 0.703546 0.703821 0.704065
Table 3: Steady state e®ects of dp¤
R = dpR = 1 with respect to pc for alternative combinations of
° and °¤
Steady state change of foreign consumer price index
°¤n° 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
0.0 0.594836 0.600685 0.605959 0.610739 0.615092
0.25 0.595464 0.601668 0.607223 0.612228 0.616759
0.5 0.596188 0.60279 0.608658 0.613905 0.618627
0.75 0.597029 0.604086 0.610299 0.615812 0.620736
1.0 0.598021 0.605596 0.612196 0.617997 0.623136
Table 4: Steady state e®ects of dp¤
R = dpR = 1 with respect to p¤c for alternative combinations
of ° and °¤
225 Alternative degrees of wage indexation
The dynamic adjustment paths presented in the last two chapters have been derived under
the assumption that the degree of wage indexation is greater in the domestic than in the
foreign economy (1 ¡ ¯ > 1 ¡ ¯¤ or equivalently ¯ < ¯¤). In this chapter we want
to discuss the question to what extent the dynamic e®ects of oil price shocks depend
upon the parameters ¯ and ¯¤.40 In what follows we only consider the two polar cases
(¯;¯¤) = (1;1) and (¯;¯¤) = (0;0) which can be identi¯ed with nominal and real wage
rigidity in both economies respectively. A variation of the parameter values of ¯ and ¯¤
does not change the steady state e®ects of raw materials price increases since the long
run equilibrium of the world system is independent of ¯ and ¯¤. Instead, it leads to
changes in the dynamic e®ects, in particular at the date of anticipation and the date of
implementation.
Firstly, we consider the output e®ects under the assumption that oil imports are com-
pletely denominated in terms of US dollars (cf. ¯gure 11). On impact, the domestic output
e®ect is stronger compared with the Benchmark scenario (B : 0 < ¯ < ¯¤ < 1) if Real
wage rigidity holds (R : ¯ = ¯¤ = 0), while it is weakened in the regime of Nominal wage
rigidity (N : ¯ = ¯¤ = 1):
q(0+)jR > q(0+)jB > q(0+)jN > q0 (29)
Although at the date of anticipation the nominal and real depreciation of the domestic
currency as well as the rise of the real factor price is stronger in regime N than in R, the
fall of the real interest rate is strongest in R and weakest in N. Thus inequality (29) must
hold if the semi-interest elasticity of private absorption is su±ciently high. An analogous
rank order holds for foreign output whereby q¤(0+)jR > q ¤
0 in general because of a strong
fall of the foreign real interest rate in the regime of real wage rigidity. After the initial
jump, q and q¤ behave as in the benchmark case, i.e. they drop continuously. At the date
of implementation there is a further output jump. In the case of nominal wage rigidity
it is again negative (due to the sharp rise of the real factor price in T). But with real
wage rigidity both the domestic and foreign output increase in T which is a consequence
of the strong fall of the real interest rate. In regime R the expansionary interest rate
e®ect dominates the opposing real factor price e®ect, while in N and B just the opposite
holds. After the output jump at time T there is a continuous contractionary process in
any regime. Since the long run equilibrium level of q and q¤ does not depend on ¯ and ¯¤
the output contraction for t > T is strongest in the case of real wage rigidity.
Next consider the output development in the case of domestic-currency denominated
oil (cf. ¯gure 12). In this case the initial domestic output jump is still positive in regime
40By contrast, the case of an increasing degree of openness is often discussed in economics literature (see,
for example, Bhandari and Turnovsky (1984)). See also the footnotes 9 and 14 in this paper.
23N of nominal wage rigidity, but is negative in regime R of real wage rigidity:
q(0+)jB > q(0+)jN > q0 > q(0+)jR (30)
An analogous inequality holds for foreign output where q¤(0+) is smaller than the initial
steady state q ¤
0 for any regime of wage indexation. If crude oil imports are priced in
Euro the domestic real interest rate rises on impact { and the increase is strongest in the
case of real wage rigidity. Regime R also leads to a sharp rise of the foreign real interest
rate while it falls on impact in the benchmark scenario and in regime N. At the date
of implementation regime R leads again to a strong rise of q and q¤ (due to a sharp fall
of the domestic and foreign real interest rate) while both output variables decrease in T
if nominal wage rigidity holds. Note that with domestic-currency denominated oil the
positive output jump in the case of real wage rigidity is greater than with foreign-currency
denominated oil. The output contraction immediately after the date of implementation is
therefore very strong in regime R. On the other hand, it is weak if nominal wage rigidity
holds.41
If the domestic output development is compared with the corresponding foreign one
we always have (q ¡q¤)(0+) > 0 and (q ¡q¤)(T+) < 0, i.e., in the short run the domestic
output variable lies above the foreign output, while the opposite holds immediately after
the date of implementation. This holds for any regime of wage indexation and does
not depend on the currency in which raw materials imports are denominated. In the
benchmark scenario as well as in the regime of nominal wage rigidity the output di®erential
q ¡ q¤ is negative for all t > T so that in these regimes the foreign output contraction
runs always weaker than the corresponding domestic contractionary process. This does
not hold in regime R of real wage rigidity. During the phase after the realization of the oil
price shock there exists a time interval [t1;t2] (with T < t1 < t2 < 1) where the output
di®erential q ¡q¤ is positive (cf. ¯gure 13). With real wage rigidity domestic output does
not only lie above foreign output immediately after the anticipation of a future oil price
rise but also during a ¯nite time span after its implementation. The reason is that both
the real interest rate di®erential and the terms of trade ¿ start to fall during a short time
interval after time T so that the output di®erential q ¡q¤ begins to rise after its negative
jump at time T.42
Now we consider the adjustment process of the in°ation rates in the case of nominal
and real wage rigidity (¯gure 14). With nominal wage rigidity in both economies the wage
in°ation rates _ w and _ w¤ are independent of the price-index based in°ation rates _ pc and _ p¤c
respectively. In this case there is no direct impact of the depreciation rate _ e on _ w and _ w¤.
In the other polar case of real wage rigidity or complete wage indexation there is a strong
in°uence of _ e on _ w and _ w¤. During the entire anticipation phase the depreciation rate
is positive. This holds for any degree of wage indexation for both foreign- and domestic-
41In regime N we also have qj(E) > qj(D) and q
¤j(E) > q
¤j(D) for any t 7 T where the subscripts E and D
denote Euro- and Dollar-denominated oil imports respectively.
42In the benchmark scenario as well as in regime N there is a process of real appreciation after the date of
implementation.
24currency denominated oil. The growth rate of nominal wages also depends on the output
gap q ¡ q and q¤ ¡ q ¤ respectively. If raw materials imports are priced in US dollars the
domestic output gap is positive on impact where it is greatest in regime R of real wage
rigidity (cf. equation (29)). Since _ eR > _ eN for 0 < t < T the domestic wage and price
in°ation rates are in the short run greater in regime R of real than in regime N of nominal
wage rigidity:
_ z(0+)jR > _ z(0+)jB > _ z(0+)jN > 0 for _ z 2 f _ w; _ p; _ pcg (31)
For the corresponding foreign in°ation rates an analogous rank order holds, where _ z¤(0+)
is negative in the benchmark case B and in regime N, while it is in general positive in
regime R.43 At the date T of the oil price increase there is a sharp rise in any domestic and
foreign in°ation rate. Since there is a positive output jump in regime R, while it is negative
in B and N, inequality (31) also holds immediately after the date of implementation (i.e.,
for t = T+). This implies that the positive jump in the domestic and foreign in°ation
rate at the date of implementation is much stronger in R than in N.44 The de°ationary
process thereafter is then stronger in R than in N or B. Note that the sharp rise of
the in°ation rates at time T in the regime of real wage rigidity is increased if imported
raw materials are priced in Euro (cf. ¯gure 15).45 The reason is that with domestic-
currency imported oil the positive output jump in T is reinforced. On the other hand,
in the benchmark scenario or in the regime of nominal wage rigidity the changeover from
foreign to domestic-currency denominated raw materials imports leads to slightly reduced
in°ation rates. After the jump in T a de°ationary process takes place which is weak in
B and N. In the regime of real wage rigidity the fall of the in°ation rates immediately
after the jump in T is very sharp and strongest in case of domestic-currency denominated
oil. Since the same holds for the output variables it is obvious that the volatility of the
nominal and real variables is strong if real wage rigidity instead of nominal wage rigidity




0 holds in general. If the corresponding parameter ±
¤ is su±ciently large, _ z
¤(0+)jR
is positive although the positive value of the rate of change _ e leads { in isolation { to a negative impact
on _ z
¤(0+) in regime R.
44Since the foreign is greater than the domestic output gap at time T and _ eR(T+) < 0, the foreign in°ation
rates _ z
¤(T+)jR are in general greater than the corresponding domestic ones.
45On the other hand, the initial jump of _ zjR and _ z
¤jR is now negative, since q and q
¤ fall on impact and the
positive value of _ e(0+) has no e®ect on _ zjR if raw materials imports are priced in Euro.
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Figure 11: Response of domestic output q (top) and foreign output q¤ (bottom) to an anticipated
oil price shock for foreign-currency denominated oil in regime B (solid lines), R (dotted lines)
and N (dashed lines)
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Figure 12: Response of domestic output q (top) and foreign output q¤ (bottom) to an anticipated
oil price shock for domestic-currency denominated oil in regime B (solid lines), R (dotted lines)
and N (dashed lines)
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Figure 13: Response of output di®erential q ¡ q¤ to an anticipated oil price shock for foreign-
currency denominated oil (top) and domestic-currency denominated oil (bottom) in regime B
(solid lines), R (dotted lines) and N (dashed lines)
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Figure 14: Response of domestic in°ation rate _ p (top) and foreign in°ation rate _ p¤ (bottom) to
an anticipated oil price shock for foreign-currency denominated oil in regime B (solid lines), R
(dotted lines) and N (dashed lines)
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Figure 15: Response of domestic in°ation rate _ p (top) and foreign in°ation rate _ p¤ (bottom) to
an anticipated oil price shock for domestic-currency denominated oil in regime B (solid lines), R
(dotted lines) and N (dashed lines)
286 Monetary Stabilization Policies
We have shown that an increase in the price of oil leads to stag°ation as well as temporary
balance of trade problems for oil-dependent economies, while the precise degree of severity
of these e®ects depends upon the degree of oil-dependency and the currency in which
OPEC oil is denominated. This section analyzes the consequences of various monetary
policy reactions that could be employed by the domestic and foreign economy in an e®ort
to reduce the potentially disruptive e®ects of oil price shocks. The section is organized
as follows: We ¯rst consider monetary policy rules that are calculated to ¯x the growth
rate of the consumer price index at its initial equilibrium level at all times. In a ¯rst
step we discuss the problem of complete stabilization of the in°ation rate based on the
consumer price index over the time interval T < t < 1. Since the anticipation of a
future increase in the price of oil not only results in in°ation after the realization of the
materials price increase but also during the time span between the anticipation and the
implementation of the oil price shock, we also analyze the problem of ¯xing the consumer
price in°ation _ pc at its initial steady state level for all t > 0. In the second part of this
section we analyze the problem of complete system stabilization: Is monetary policy able
to neutralize all adjustment dynamics that result from an anticipated increase in the price
of raw materials imports? The absorption of the dynamic e®ects of anticipated oil price
shocks means ¯xing the endogenous variables of the world system at their respective initial
steady state level during the whole anticipation phase and after the implementation of the
oil price increase ¯xing them at their respective new steady state level for all t > T. We
will show that this is possible by a suitable combination of contractionary domestic and
foreign monetary policy but that there may occur time inconsistency problems.
6.1 Stabilization of the Consumer In°ation Rate
We ¯rst consider the problem of ¯xing the domestic consumer in°ation rate _ pc at its initial
steady state level _ pc = 0 for all t > T.46 Such an e®ect may be achieved by adjusting the
growth rate of domestic money supply according to the policy rule







This rule must be credibly announced at time t = 0 to be implemented at the date of the
oil price increase T. Since the rise of p¤
R leads to temporary in°ation (cf. ¯gure 4) it is
obvious that _ m must be negative for T < t < 1 (¯gure 16). The policy rule (32) not
only prevents consumer price in°ation for all t > T but also leads to a dampening of the
price and wage in°ation rates _ p and _ w (¯gure 17). Since the policy rule is anticipated by
the public it leads to adjustment dynamics during the time span 0 < t < T (¯gure 18).
The contractionary monetary policy rule causes on impact a rise of the terms of trade ¿,
a decline in domestic output and de°ation, i.e. a fall of the in°ation rates _ p and _ pc during
46We assume that initially _ m0 = 0 holds.
29the whole anticipation phase 0 < t < T.47 On the other hand, it leads to an increase of
foreign output and to foreign in°ation during the time span 0 < t < T.
To avoid domestic de°ation during the anticipation period the monetary policy rule
(32) must already be implemented at the time of anticipation of the oil price shock, i.e. at
t = 0. It then guarantees _ pc = 0 at any time t > 0. Note that the growth rate of money
supply that is induced by the policy rule (32) must be positive for 0 < t < T (¯gure 19).
This is not surprising since the anticipation of a future contraction in monetary growth
rate as a response to the realization of the oil price increase causes on impact domestic
disin°ation which can only be removed by an expansionary monetary policy over the time
interval 0 < t < T.
A unilateral ¯xing of the rate of change of the domestic price index with the help of
the domestic policy rule (32) has the drawback that it causes foreign in°ation during the
anticipation phase and is unable to reduce the in°ationary e®ects for the foreign economy
which occur after the implementation of the oil price increase (¯gure 20).
A simultaneous stabilization of the domestic and foreign consumer in°ation rate at
their respective initial steady state level is only possible if in addition to the domestic
monetary policy rule an analogous foreign policy rule is implemented at the time of an-
ticipation of the oil price shock:







Figure 21 shows that the growth rate of foreign money supply that results from (33) is
negative for both t < T and t > T. It must be negative for T < t < 1 in order to
eliminate foreign in°ation for t > T. In contrast to domestic monetary policy it must
also be negative during the anticipation phase 0 < t < T since the implementation of the
domestic monetary policy rule leads to relatively strong foreign in°ationary e®ects over
the time interval 0 < t < T. These e®ects can not be neutralized by the anticipation
e®ects of the contractionary foreign monetary policy rule (33) if it is implemented at time
T.
47The fact that a credible announcement of a contractionary monetary policy leads to disin°ation even
before the contraction actually occurs is a well known result, see Ball (1994). Due to the contractionary
e®ect of the real appreciation we do not ¯nd { in contrast to Ball (1994) in an closed economy model { a
disin°ationary boom in our open economy framework.
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Figure 16: Development of domestic monetary growth rate _ m according to the policy rule (32)
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Figure 17: Response of domestic price and wage in°ation rate _ p and _ w respectively to an unsta-
bilized (solid lines) and a stabilized oil price shock (dashed lines)
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Figure 18: Response of terms of trade ¿, domestic output q, domestic price in°ation rate _ p,
domestic consumer price in°ation rate _ pc, foreign output q and foreign consumer in°ation rate
_ p¤c to an isolated oil price shock (solid lines) and to a stabilized oil price shock (dashed lines)
during the anticipation period


























_ pc; _ p¤c
_ p; _ p¤




















Figure 19: Development of domestic monetary growth rate _ m during the anticipation period
according to the policy rule (32)
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Figure 20: Response of foreign consumer in°ation rate _ p¤c to an unstabilized (solid lines) and
a stabilized (dashed lines) oil price shock
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Figure 21: Development of foreign monetary growth rate _ m¤ according to the policy rule (33)
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Figure 22: Response of domestic and foreign output q and q¤ respectively to an isolated oil price
shock (solid lines) and to a stabilized oil price shock (dashed lines)
346.2 Complete System Stabilization
The implementation of the policy rules (32) and (33) has the disadvantage that during
the time interval 0 < t < 1 it leads to a permanent change of the growth rate of do-
mestic and foreign money supply. A further disadvantage is that, with the exception of
the in°ation rates _ pc and _ p¤c, they cannot prevent adjustment dynamics of the endoge-
nous variables induced by the oil price shock. In particular, the contractionary output
e®ects after the realization of the oil price shock are temporarily increased (¯gure 22).
The question therefore arises whether monetary policy is able to eliminate all dynamic
e®ects of an anticipated increase of the price of raw materials imports. On the one hand,
that means the neutralization of the anticipation e®ects of a future rise of p¤
R, i.e. the
¯xing of all endogenous variables of the system at their respective initial steady state level
for 0 < t < T. On the other hand, complete system stabilization requires an instanta-
neous jump into the new steady state of the whole system after the implementation of
the materials price increase. In this case there are also no adjustment processes in the
period after the exogenous price shock. If this is possible by a suitable monetary policy,
adjustment dynamics (for example business cycles or divergent economic developments
across the large open economies) can be avoided both for t < T and t > T. In the
mathematical appendix it is shown that the economic policy goal of complete system sta-
bilization is attainable by an international coordination of monetary policy which requires
a once-and-for-all reduction of both the domestic and foreign growth rate of money supply.
Dynamic E®ects of an Oil Price Increase under Endogenous Oil Pricing Rules
A permanent decline of the growth rate of foreign money supply (d _ m¤ < 0) has the e®ect
that { given a constant US dollar price of imported raw materials for t > T { no steady
state of the foreign real factor price p¤
R ¡ p¤ exists. Without a permanent adjustment of
the price of oil there would be a long run positive or negative growth of the real factor
price p¤
R ¡ p¤ with the rate _ p¤
R ¡ _ p¤
1 = ¡ _ m¤
1 = ¡( _ m¤
0 + d _ m¤).48 It seems therefore natural
to endogenize the foreign-currency price of oil according to the pricing rule49
_ p¤
R = _ m¤ (34)
or
_ p¤
R = _ p¤ (35)
The pricing rule can be rationalized if the initial steady state is characterized by a positive
growth rate of foreign money supply (i.e., _ m¤
0 > 0) so that the foreign in°ation rate is
initially positive (_ p¤
0 = _ m¤
0 > 0). Given a ¯xed level of the US dollar price of oil the foreign
real factor price p¤
R ¡ p¤ would then fall continuously throughout the anticipation phase
leading to a continuous deterioration of the terms of trade of the oil-exporting nation with
48Note that in the long run the in°ation rate is determined by the growth rate of money supply. _ m
¤
0 denotes
the initial, _ m
¤
1 the new monetary growth rate. If _ m
¤
0 > 0 then _ m
¤
1 may also be positive although d _ m
¤ < 0.
49It is also possible to couple _ p
¤
R with ¡_ e if oil imports are priced in dollars. Cf. Youse¯ and Wirjanto
(2004).
35respect to the large foreign economy. To prevent such a process of real depreciation from
the perspective of the oil-exporting economy the rate of change of the oil price must be
coupled with the monetary growth rate _ m¤ or the foreign in°ation rate _ p¤. In the ¯rst
case both the adjustment dynamics and steady state e®ects of a once-and-for-all increase
of the factor price p¤
R remain unchanged while under the second materials pricing rule
the dynamics and long run e®ects change considerably compared with the benchmark
scenario _ p¤
R = _ m¤ = 0.50 If the rate of change of the foreign-currency price of oil is
coupled with the foreign in°ation rate _ p¤ then the real factor price p¤
R ¡ p¤ does not rise
for 0 < t < T (as in the benchmark case) but persists at its initial steady state level during
the whole anticipation phase. At the date of implementation of the oil price increase the
real factor price p¤
R ¡ p¤ rises by the same amount as p¤
R and remains at its new steady
state level thereafter (¯gure 23). A further striking result that di®ers considerably from
the benchmark scenario is the real appreciation of the domestic currency over the interval
0 < t < T causing a domestic output contraction on impact and a foreign output expansion
(¯gure 25).
At the date of implementation of the oil price rise there is now a discontinuous increase
of q and q¤ { although the real factor prices p¤
R +e¡p and p¤
R ¡p¤ rise sharply at time T
(¯gure 23). The reason is that at time T a strong increase of the consumer in°ation rates
_ pc and _ p¤c takes place (¯gure 24) leading to a strong fall of the domestic and foreign real
interest rate. After the output jump in T a sharp output contraction in both economies
occurs (¯gure 25). Since the long run rise of the real factor prices is reinforced if _ p¤
R is
coupled with the in°ation rate _ p¤, the steady state output contraction in both economies
is stronger than in the benchmark scenario. From the perspective of the oil-exporting
nation the steady state improvement of its terms of trade (i.e., the real factor prices) with
respect to the oil-importing economies is reinforced (¯gure 23). According to equations
(24) and (25) this does not imply that the real oil imports of the large open economies
increase in the long run. On the contrary, the steady state rise of the domestic and foreign
trade balance with respect to OPEC is generally increased under the pricing rule _ p¤
R = _ p¤.
50Note that if _ m
¤ > 0 initially and _ p
¤
R = _ m
¤ holds, the input price p
¤
R already increases continuously during
the time interval 0 < t < T, i.e., before the discontinuous price shock dp
¤
R > 0 occurs. The same holds
under the pricing rule _ p
¤
R = _ p
¤, since _ p
¤ > 0 for 0 < t < T if _ p
¤
R is coupled with _ p
¤. Note that in the
benchmark scenario, i.e. in case _ p
¤
R = _ m
¤ = 0, the foreign in°ation rate is negative for 0 < t < T (cf.
¯gure 4). Under the pricing rule _ p
¤
R = _ p
¤ the development of the foreign in°ation rate _ p
¤ is identical with
the adjustment of the wage rate _ w
¤, since in this case equation (14) is equivalent to _ p
¤ = _ w
¤.
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Figure 23: Response of foreign and domestic real factor price p¤
R ¡p¤ and p¤
R +e¡p respectively
to an anticipated oil price increase in the benchmark case (solid lines) and in the case _ p¤
R = _ p¤
(dashed lines)
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Figure 24: Response of domestic and foreign consumer price in°ation rate _ pc and _ p¤c respectively
to an anticipated oil price increase in the benchmark case (solid lines) and in the case _ p¤
R = _ p¤
(dashed lines)
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Figure 25: Response of terms of trade ¿, domestic and foreign output q and q¤ respectively to an
anticipated oil price increase in the benchmark case (solid lines) and in the case _ p¤
R = _ p¤ (dashed
lines)
38The System-Stabilizing Monetary Policy
Consider now the international coordination of monetary policy to attain complete system
stabilization if either the materials pricing rule (34) or (35) holds. We ¯rst discuss full
system stabilization in the period 0 < t < T prior to the implementation of the rise of the
US dollar price of oil. In the mathematical appendix it is shown that the removal of any
anticipation e®ects of a future oil price shock is achievable by the credible announcement
of a unilateral monetary policy action at time t = 0 to take e®ect at the time of imple-
mentation of the factor price increase. If the materials pricing rule _ p¤
R = _ m¤ holds, the
exogenous price shock dp¤
R > 0 leads on impact to a fall of the domestic terms of trade ¿
(¿(0+) < ¿0, cf. ¯gure 2). Fixing ¿ at its initial steady state level ¿0 requires the credible
announcement of a contractionary domestic monetary policy, i.e. d _ mann: < 0.51 In case
of the pricing rule _ p¤
R = _ p¤ the terms of trade ¿ rise on impact (cf. ¯gure 25) so that the
credible announcement of a contractionary foreign monetary policy (i.e., d _ m¤ ann: < 0)
stabilizes ¿ and the other endogenous variables at their respective initial steady state level
during the whole anticipation phase.52. In particular, the in°ation rates remain constant
in this period and no output contraction can occur prior to the implementation of the oil
price increase.
If the domestic and foreign central bank in the case of the pricing rule _ p¤
R = _ m¤ and
_ p¤
R = _ p¤ respectively implement the announced reduction in monetary growth and given
the discretionary increase of the oil price in T, the state vector (ls;¿;ld)0 continuously
moves in period t > T to a new steady state that di®ers from that one in the case of
a passive monetary policy. In a phase diagram the state vector (ls;¿;ld)0 without jump
converges across a stable trajectory from its initial steady state towards its new steady state
(¯gure 26).53 In comparison with the new steady state in case of a passive monetary policy
we get the same rise of the equilibrium value of the terms of trade ¿ (cf. ¯gure 27). On the
other hand, the long run fall of the aggregate monetary state variable ls induced by the oil
price increase dp¤
R > 0 is now weaker, since the monetary policy d _ m < 0 (d _ m¤ < 0 in case
_ p¤
R = _ p¤ respectively) in isolation leads to a rise of the steady state variable l
s
. The same
holds for the di®erence variable l
d
in case d _ m < 0 (cf. ¯gure 27, left), while the fall of l
d
is
reinforced if d _ m¤ < 0 holds (cf. ¯gure 27, right).54 Adjustment dynamics throughout the
51The precise formula for d _ m
ann: is given in the mathematical appendix, Section D. Note that the policy is
consistent with the goal of price stability since it does not lead to a long run rise of the domestic in°ation
rates _ p and _ p
c.
52It is a well known result that the anticipation of a future once-and-for-all fall of the growth rate of money
supply leads on impact to a real appreciation. See, for example, Clausen and Wohltmann (2005).
53The trajectory lies on the stable saddle path belonging to the initial steady state. The formula for the
stable saddle path, which is a hyperplane in the case of a three-dimensional state vector, is presented in
the mathematical appendix.





























39period after the oil price shock also occur for the other endogenous variables of the system
(cf. ¯gure 28), i.e. cannot be avoided by the implementation of the announced restrictive
monetary policy. Since the stabilization of the system prior to the implementation of the
oil price shock requires a weak contractionary monetary policy the output development for
t > T in the case of an active monetary policy di®ers only slightly from the corresponding
output adjustment in case of a passive monetary policy (cf. ¯gure 28). Compared with
the case of a passive monetary policy (d _ m = 0) the jumps of the in°ation rates at time
T are now slightly smaller (¯gure 29). Moreover, a long run fall of the domestic in°ation
rates takes place if d _ mann: < 0 is actually implemented.55
The removal of any adjustment dynamics throughout the period t > T will only be
achieved if the central bank deviates from the previously announced and therefore antici-
pated contractionary monetary policy by implementing a reduction of the growth rate of
money supply which is stronger than the announced one (i.e., d _ mimpl: < d _ mann:). More-
over, full system stabilization for t > T is not attainable by a unilateral monetary policy
response but requires a simultaneous coordinated action of the domestic and foreign cen-
tral bank in the sense that both the domestic and foreign monetary growth rate must be
reduced at time T in a non-anticipated manner (i.e., d _ mimpl: < 0 and d _ m¤ impl: < 0, cf.
¯gure 30).56 An analogous result holds in case d _ m¤ ann: < 0, i.e. if the pricing rule _ p¤
R = _ p¤
holds.
In the mathematical appendix it is shown that the realized domestic and foreign mon-
etary policy does not depend upon the underlying materials pricing rule. It can also be
shown that the long run total change of any endogenous variable remains unchanged if
the pricing rule _ p¤
R = _ m¤ is replaced by _ p¤
R = _ p¤. In particular,
dxj _ p¤
R= _ m¤ = dxj _ p¤
R= _ p¤ for x 2 fq;q¤g (36)
holds. Since foreign monetary policy has long run output e®ects, if _ p¤
R = _ m¤, while it is
neutral under the pricing rule _ p¤
R = _ p¤57, equation (36) implies that the decrease of _ m¤
reinforces the long run output contraction of oil price shocks, provided _ p¤
R = _ m¤ holds.
The total output contraction induced by the oil price shock and the monetary policy
response coincides with the long run output decrease of the price shock in case p¤
R = _ p¤.58
The required reduction of _ m and _ m¤ to achieve full system stabilization is determined by
the condition that all impulses taken together { the oil price shock and the domestic and
foreign policy response { do not change the initial steady state values of the monetary
55The same holds for the foreign in°ation rates _ p
¤ and _ p
¤c in case that d _ m
¤ ann: < 0 is realized at time T.
56Note that if the removal of adjustment dynamics is required only for the period after the implementation
of the oil price shock, the domestic and foreign growth rate of money supply must be reduced at time T in
an anticipated manner (cf. the mathematical appendix, Section D.4). In this case there exist anticipation
e®ects which lead on impact to a reduction in domestic and an increase in foreign output. Moreover, a
disin°ationary process in the domestic and an in°ationary process in the foreign economy occur during
the anticipation phase 0 < t < T.
57See the mathematical appendix, Section D.
58Note that the price shock dp
¤
R > 0 has stronger steady state output e®ects under the pricing rule _ p
¤
R = _ p
¤
than in case _ p
¤
R = _ m
¤ (cf. ¯gure 23).

















dxi = 0 xi 2 fp¤
R; _ m¤; _ mg (37)
Saddle path stability and the sluggishness of the state variables ls and ld then imply that in
a three-dimensional phase diagram the state vector in T jumps in response to the oil price
increase and the correction of expectations with respect to the actual growth rate of money
supply vertically along the ¿ axis into its new steady state and remains there thereafter.
The same holds for the other jump variables of the system (q and q¤ in particular) where
the jump in T coincides with the steady state change of the corresponding variable, which
is independent from T and the assumed materials pricing rule. Since the price shock
dp¤




, and the steady state e®ects of d _ m < 0 with
respect to the state variables ls and ld are completely symmetric, foreign monetary policy




induced by the shock dp¤
R > 0. Such a monetary





































¢ d(m¤ ¡ p¤) = 0
Solving this equation for _ m¤ leads to the decision rule for foreign monetary policy. Since
both multipliers @(m¤ ¡ p¤)=@p¤
R and @(m¤ ¡ p¤)=@ _ m¤ are negative it follows that a re-
duction of the growth rate of foreign money supply is required to stabilize the foreign real
money stock at its initial equilibrium level.
Complete system stabilization for t > T is achievable if the foreign monetary policy is





of equal size such that their initial steady state levels are attained. Obviously, domestic
monetary policy then ¯xes domestic real money supply at its initial equilibrium level (i.e.,
d(m ¡ p) = 0) which requires a fall of the growth rate of domestic money supply by the
amount
d _ m =
¡1








@ _ m¤ d _ m¤
¶
< 0 (39)
where @(m ¡ p)=@ _ m = ¡l2 and @(m ¡ p)=@ _ m¤ = 0 in case _ p¤
R = _ p¤. The realized domestic
monetary policy (39) is stronger contractionary than the one previously announced.59 The
reason is that the implementation of the pre-announced contractionary monetary policy is
insu±cient to stabilize the domestic real money supply at its initial steady state level. The
actual reduction of the growth rate of domestic money supply must therefore be stronger
than the announced one.
59The same holds in case of an announced foreign monetary policy (d _ m
¤ implemented < d _ m
¤ announced < 0).
41The announcement or anticipation of a contractionary monetary policy and the actual
implementation of a policy which is more restrictive, means that in quantitative terms the
behavior of the central bank is time-inconsistent.60 In contrast, monetary policy remains
time-consistent in qualitative terms because the previously announced and the actual
course of monetary policy still move in the same direction.61 The quantitative deviation
of the actual policy from the announced policy response does not seriously undermine
the reputation of monetary policy.62 This holds the more as the long run in°ation rate
decreases in both cases so that the goal of price stability is not violated. Finally, the
changeover from the previously announced monetary policy to the actual response (39)
in combination with an unexpected international monetary policy coordination leads to
a complete system stabilization. Adjustment dynamics of the domestic and foreign real
variables as well as temporary in°ation resulting from an anticipated increase in the US
dollar price of oil can be completely avoided.
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Figure 26: Response of state vector (ls;¿;ld)0 for t > T to an active monetary policy (pale line)
and to a passive monetary policy (solid line) for both the pricing rule _ p¤
R = _ m¤ (left) and the
pricing rule _ p¤
R = _ p¤ (right) in a phase diagram; initial steady state (bold dot)
60Note that time-inconsistency problems can only occur in case T > 0, i.e., if exogenous price shocks are
anticipated and if { in addition { full system stabilization shall be achieved both prior to and after the
implementation of the oil price shock. If the anticipation e®ects are not neutralized no time-inconsistency
problems occur.
61Cf. Wohltmann und Clausen (2003).
62Several numerical simulations illustrate that if p
¤
R increases by one unit (dp
¤
R = 1) the di®erence between
d _ m
ann: and d _ m
impl: may be greater than 1 (cf. ¯gure 30). The removal of the anticipation e®ects of the
price shock dp
¤
R = 1 only requires a small reduction of the growth rate of domestic money supply, while
for the neutralization of the dynamic e®ects after the implementation of the oil price increase a strong
decrease of _ m is necessary (cf. ¯gure 30).
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Figure 27: Response of state vector (ls;¿;ld)0 to an active monetary policy (dashed lines) and
to a passive monetary policy (solid lines) for both the pricing rule _ p¤
R = _ m¤ (left) and the pricing
rule _ p¤
R = _ p¤ (right)
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Figure 28: Response of domestic and foreign output q and q¤ respectively to an active monetary
policy (dashed lines) and to a passive monetary policy (solid lines) for both the pricing rule
_ p¤
R = _ m¤ (left) and the pricing rule _ p¤
R = _ p¤ (right)
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Figure 29: Response of domestic and foreign consumer price in°ation rate _ pc and _ p¤c respectively
to an active monetary policy (dashed lines) and to a passive monetary policy (solid lines) for
both the pricing rule _ p¤
R = _ m¤ (left) and the pricing rule _ p¤
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Figure 30: Left: Announced growth rate of domestic money supply (dot-dashed line) and
realized growth rate of domestic (solid line) and foreign money supply (dotted line) in case
_ p¤
R = _ m¤. Right: Announced growth rate of foreign money supply (dashed line) and realized
growth rate of domestic (solid line) and foreign money supply (dashed line) in case _ p¤
R = _ p¤
7 Summary of the Main Results
This paper has analyzed a macrodynamic model of two large open economies which are
completely dependent upon oil imports from a small third country. It is assumed that the
domestic economy (like the European Monetary Union) is stronger oil-dependent than the
foreign economy (the USA) and that the degree of wage indexation is greater in Europe
than in the US economy. The main results of the analysis may be summarized as follows:
(a) An anticipated permanent increase in the dollar price of oil will involve both economies
in a stag°ationary situation over the long run. Both economies su®er from temporary
in°ation, long run price and real factor price increases and a permanent output con-
traction. The stag°ationary e®ects are stronger for the domestic economy because
of its higher degree of oil-dependency. The domestic terms of trade with respect to
the large foreign economy improve permanently while for both large open economies
the intermediate goods terms of trade with respect to the oil-exporter deteriorate
in the long run. Since domestic output falls the trade balances with respect to the
oil-exporting nation generally do not deteriorate in the long run.
(b) The impact e®ects of anticipated oil price shocks are in sharp contrast to the steady
state e®ects. The domestic terms of trade fall instantaneously causing a stimulation
of domestic real output above its pre-disturbance level. On the other hand, real
output of the large foreign economy on impact decreases while the decline is smaller
than the long run contraction. The same holds at the date of implementation of
the oil price increase. The rise of the real factor price of oil induces both in the
domestic and foreign economy a decline of real output which is smaller than the
long run output reduction. This leads to a temporary deterioration of the trade
balance against the oil-exporting nation.
(c) The paper also discusses the dynamic e®ects of an oil price increase if oil is denom-
45inated in terms of domestic currency (Euro) rather than US dollars. It is demon-
strated that under such pricing the stag°ationary e®ects of oil price shocks are
reduced. This holds for both the domestic and the foreign economy. With domestic-
currency denominated oil both large open economies are better insulated against oil
price increases, except for the fact that the long run improvement of the bilateral
real trade balance with respect to the oil-exporting nation is weakened. On impact,
the jumps of the output variables are weakened as well.
(d) In addition to the polar cases that oil imports are either completely priced in US
dollars or in terms of the domestic currency (Euro), we have also discussed a com-
bination of these cases, i.e. that a ¯xed share of imported raw materials imports
is denominated in dollars while the other share is priced in Euro. It is shown that
any mixed case of currency denomination generates long run stag°ationary results
for both economies which are stronger than in the polar case that all oil imports are
priced in Euro. For both large open economies the long run stag°ationary e®ects of
materials price increases are minimized if all imports of raw materials or other in-
termediate goods are completely denominated in terms of Euro. On the other hand,
in the case of domestic-currency denominated oil the steady state improvement of
the domestic and foreign trade balance with respect to the oil-exporting nation is
smallest.
(e) The paper also discusses the adjustment dynamics of anticipated oil price shocks
under alternative degrees of wage indexation in the wage adjustment equations of
the Phillips' curve type. While the steady state e®ects of an increase of raw materials
imports do not depend on the degree of domestic and foreign wage indexation, this
does not hold for the anticipation e®ects and the dynamic e®ects resulting from the
implementation of the oil price rise. Under real wage rigidity in both economies and
with foreign-currency denominated oil, domestic and foreign output on impact rise
simultaneously and { due to a strong fall of real interest rates { also at the date
of implementation of the oil price shock. The initial increase of domestic output is
stronger than in the benchmark scenario (where incomplete and asymmetric wage
indexation is assumed). In case of domestic-currency denominated oil the initial
jumps of domestic and foreign output are both negative under the regime of real
wage rigidity. At the date of implementation of the oil price shock the output jumps
are again positive and stronger than in the case of foreign-currency denominated
oil imports. The regime of real wage rigidity also leads to higher in°ation rates
(compared with the benchmark scenario) during the course of adjustment. In this
regime the changeover from foreign to domestic-currency denominated oil has the
e®ect that the positive jumps of the in°ation rates at the date of implementation
are not weakened but reinforced.
(f) The paper also analyzes two types of monetary stabilization policies. It is shown
that an international monetary policy coordination is able to ¯x the domestic and
46foreign consumer in°ation rate at its initial pre-disturbance steady state level at all
times. The policy rules for the domestic and foreign growth rate of money supply
do not lead to saddle point instability problems, but cause a rise of the positive
eigenvalue of the system dynamics. Stabilization of the consumer in°ation rates
requires a contractionary monetary policy after the realization of the oil price shock.
Since the anticipation of these policies leads to a de°ation in the domestic economy,
domestic monetary policy must be expansionary prior to the implementation of the
factor price increase.
In a second step the problem of complete system stabilization, i.e. the removal of any
adjustment dynamics caused by an anticipated materials price shock, is discussed.
Fixing all endogenous variables throughout the anticipation phase at their respective
initial steady state level requires a credible and unilateral announcement of a future
once-and-for-all decrease of the growth rate of money supply. Since the realization of
such a contractionary monetary policy is not su±cient to neutralize all adjustment
dynamics after the implementation of the oil price increase, the realized monetary
policy must be stronger contractionary than the announced one. In addition, full
system stabilization after the implementation of the oil price shock requires an inter-
national monetary policy coordination in the sense of a simultaneous unanticipated
reduction of the growth rate of domestic and foreign money supply. In this case
all endogenous variables after the occurrence of the price shock immediately jump
into their new steady state levels. The new steady state of the complete stabilized
system is characterized by a permanent reduction of the domestic and foreign in°a-
tion rate. On the other hand, the output contraction induced by the rise of the US
dollar price of oil is reinforced. This result holds, since foreign monetary policy has
{ in contrast to domestic monetary policy { long run output e®ects if the US dollar
price of oil is not coupled with the foreign price level. Moreover, the announcement
of a weak and the actual implementation of an unexpected stronger contractionary
monetary policy may lead to time-inconsistency problems in quantitative, but not
in qualitative terms.
47Mathematical Appendix
A Foreign-Currency Denominated Oil Imports
We use the method by Aoki (1981) and transform the whole system (1){(18) into two
subsystems, a di®erence system and an aggregate system. The di®erence and the aggregate
system consist of the di®erence and aggregation respectively of corresponding equations of
the domestic and foreign economy (like the di®erence (aggregation) of the IS equations).
It contains di®erence and aggregate variables, like q ¡ q¤ and q + q¤ respectively. The
original variables can be obtained using the arithmetic mean of corresponding di®erence
and aggregate variables. Since the supply side of the world system is asymmetric it is not
possible to solve the di®erence system independently of the aggregate system.
The di®erence system consists of the following equations:
(1 ¡ a1 + 2c1)(q ¡ q¤) = 2c0 + g ¡ g¤ ¡ a2id
r ¡ (2c3 ¡ (a1 ¡ 2c1)Ã)¿ (A1)
+ (a1 ¡ 2c1)(Ã ¡ Ã¤)(p¤ ¡ p¤
R)
y ¡ y¤ = q ¡ q¤ + Ã¿ + (Ã ¡ Ã¤)(p¤ ¡ p¤
R) (A2)
ld = (® + ®¤ ¡ 2)¿ + l1(q ¡ q¤) (A3)
+ l2 _ ¿ + l2_ ld ¡ l2( _ m ¡ _ m¤)

















( _ m ¡ _ p)
+
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(_ p¤ ¡ _ p¤
R)
q ¡ q¤ = f0 ¡ f¤
0 + (f1 + f¤





r = (i ¡ _ pc) ¡ (i¤ ¡ _ p¤c) = (1 ¡ (® + ®¤))_ ¿ (A6)
is the real interest rate di®erential. (A1) is the di®erence of the IS equations, (A2) the
di®erence of the income equations (9) and (10), (A3) represents the di®erence of the
LM equations (where ld is the di®erence of domestic and foreign real money supply and
_ e = ¡_ ¿ ¡ _ ld + _ m ¡ _ m¤ is substituted for the nominal interest rate di®erential i ¡ i¤).
Equation (A4) is a combination of the di®erence of corresponding domestic and foreign
dynamic price and wage equations, while (A5) represents the di®erence of the long run
aggregate supply functions (17) and (18). Substituting equation (A4) for q ¡ q¤ in the IS
48and LM equation (A1) and (A3) respectively and using the transformations
_ m ¡ _ p =
1
2
(_ ls + _ ld); _ m¤ ¡ _ p¤ =
1
2
(_ ls ¡ _ ld) (A7)
(where _ ls is the rate of change of aggregate real money stock) and




(_ ls ¡ _ ld) + _ m¤ ¡ _ p¤
R (A8)
equations (A1), (A3) and (A4) can be rewritten in the form
µ
¸·1 + a2(1 ¡ (® + ®¤))
¶

























_ ld + ¸(q ¡ q¤) + ¸·2( _ m¤ ¡ _ p¤
R) =
2c0 + g ¡ g¤ ¡ (2c3 ¡ (a1 ¡ 2c1)Ã)¿ ¡
1
2




(a1 ¡ 2c1)(Ã ¡ Ã¤)ld + (a1 ¡ 2c1)(Ã ¡ Ã¤)(m¤ ¡ p¤
R)



























_ ls ¡ l2( _ m ¡ _ m¤) + l1(q ¡ q¤)
+ l1·2( _ m¤ ¡ _ p¤
R) = ld + (2 ¡ ® ¡ ®¤)¿
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where we have used the abbreviations


















49The aggregate system consists of the equations
(1 ¡ a1)(q + q¤) = 2a0 ¡ 2d0a1 ¡ a2is
r + g + g¤ + a1Ã¿ (A15)
+ a1(Ã + Ã¤)(p¤ ¡ p¤
R)
y + y¤ = q + q¤ + Ã¿ + (Ã + Ã¤)(p¤ ¡ p¤
R) ¡ 2d0 (A16)
ls = (® ¡ ®¤)¿ + 2l0 + l1(q + q¤) ¡ l2(2i¤ + _ e) (A17)







































(_ p¤ ¡ _ p¤
R)
q + q¤ = f0 + f¤
0 + (f1 + f2 ¡ f¤





r = (i ¡ _ pc) + (i¤ ¡ _ p¤c) = 2i¤ + _ e ¡ (_ pc + _ p¤c) (A20)
is the sum of the real interest rates i ¡ _ pc and i¤ ¡ _ p¤c. Combining the aggregate IS and
LM equation (A15) and (A17) and substituting (A8) and (A18) for _ p¤ ¡ _ p¤
R and q + q¤
respectively leads to the dynamic equation
(a2l1 + l2(1 ¡ a1))·3 _ ¿ + (a2l1 + l2(1 ¡ a1))·4_ ls (A21)
+ (a2l1 + l2(1 ¡ a1))·5_ ld ¡ a2l2(_ pc + _ p¤c)
+ (a2l1 + l2(1 ¡ a1))·6( _ m¤ ¡ _ p¤
R) + (a2l1 + l2(1 ¡ a1))(q + q¤) =
a2ls + (l2a1Ã ¡ a2(® ¡ ®¤))¿ + l2(g + g¤)
+ l2a1(Ã + Ã¤)(p¤ ¡ p¤




















































50In (A21) the aggregate in°ation rate _ pc + _ p¤c can be replaced by the tautological equation
_ pc + _ p¤c = _ pc ¡ _ p + _ p¤c ¡ _ p¤ + _ p ¡ _ m + _ p¤ ¡ _ m¤ + _ m + _ m¤ (A26)
= (® ¡ ®¤)_ ¿ ¡ _ ls + _ m + _ m¤
while the intermediate goods terms of trade p¤¡p¤




(cf. (A8)). Equations (A9), (A10) and (A21) then represent the state space form of the






















where the matrices B = (bij)1·i;j·3 and C = (cij)1·i;j·3 are de¯ned by
b11 = (a2l1 + l2(1 ¡ a1))·4 + a2l2 (A28)
b12 = (a2l1 + l2(1 ¡ a1))·3 ¡ a2l2(® ¡ ®¤) (A29)









































b32 = l1·1 + l2 (A35)













c11 = a2 ¡
1
2
l2a1(Ã + Ã¤) (A37)








(a1 ¡ 2c1)(Ã ¡ Ã¤) (A40)




(a1 ¡ 2c1)(Ã ¡ Ã¤) (A42)
c31 = 0 (A43)
c32 = 2 ¡ (® + ®¤) (A44)
c33 = 1 (A45)
51The steady state of the dynamic system (A27) is obtained if
_ ls = _ ¿ = _ ld = 0 (A46)
holds. Equations (A9), (A10) together with (A5) then imply the steady state di®erence
system
¸(f1 + f¤















R ¡ m¤) ¡ ¸·2( _ m¤ ¡ _ p¤
R) + g ¡ g¤ + 2c0 + ¸(f¤
0 ¡ f0)
¡ (2c3 ¡ (a1 ¡ 2c1)Ã)¿ ¡
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2
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+ (2 ¡ ® ¡ ®¤)¿ = ¡l2( _ m ¡ _ m¤) + l1·2( _ m¤ ¡ _ p¤
R) (A48)
+ l1(f1 + f¤
1 + f2)¿ + l1(f0 ¡ f¤
0)












+ m¤ ¡ p¤
R
¶





(ls ¡ ld) + m¤ ¡ p¤
R (A49)
The steady state equation of the aggregate system follows from (A19), (A21), (A26) and
the steady state condition (A46):
(a2l1 + l2(1 ¡ a1))
½
(f1 + f2 ¡ f¤
















+ f0 + f¤
0 + ·6( _ m¤ ¡ _ p¤
R)
¾
= 2a0l2 ¡ 2l0a2 ¡ 2d0a1l2 + a2l2( _ m + _ m¤)















+ l2(g + g¤)
+ l2a1(Ã + Ã¤)(m¤ ¡ p¤
R)
Assuming _ m¤ = _ p¤
R = 0 and constant values of g, g¤ and m¤ the steady state system
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2) ¡ (a1 ¡ 2c1)(Ã ¡ Ã¤)
¶
(A53)
f13 = ¡f12 (A54)
f21 = 2 ¡ ® ¡ ®¤ ¡ l1(f1 + f¤
1 + f2) (A55)
















f33 = a2 ¡ f32 (A60)
The determinant jFj of the steady state matrix F = (fij)1·i;j·3 is in general positive and
given by
jFj = f12f31 ¡ f11f32 + a2(f11f22 ¡ f12f21) (A61)

















f22a2 ¡ f32 ¡f12a2 f12
f23f31 ¡ f21f33 f11f33 + f12f31 ¡f11f23 ¡ f12f21


























































> 0 , (A68)
¸(f2 ¡ f¤
2) > (a1 ¡ 2c1)(Ã ¡ Ã¤)








































































































, f11(f2 ¡ f¤
2) > 2f12(f1 + f¤
1 + f2) (A77)
, (f2 ¡ f¤
2)
¡
2c3 ¡ (a1 ¡ 2c1)Ã
¢
+ (a1 ¡ 2c1)(Ã ¡ Ã¤)(f1 + f¤
1 + f2) > 0
This inequality is met since we have assumed Ã > Ã¤, f2 > f¤
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R if ¾¤ · ¾ and f12 > 0.












































A + e A0h0er0t + e A2h2er2t for t ¸ T (A81)
(A80) represents the general solution of the dynamic system (A27) during the anticipation
phase 0 < t < T while (A81) is the bounded solution of (A27) after the realization of the
shock at time T. r0, r1, r2 are the eigenvalues of the matrix
G = B¡1C = (gij)1·i;j·3 (A82)



















(g21g13 ¡ g23(g11 ¡ rj)) (A85)
and
¢j = (g11 ¡ rj)(g22 ¡ rj) ¡ g12g21 (A86)
The dynamic system (A27) exhibits saddlepoint behavior. It has two stable (r0, r2) and
one unstable (r1) eigenvalue. The determination of the constants A0, A1, A2, e A0 and e A2
55results from the continuity conditions63
z(0+) = z0 for z 2 fls;ldg (A87)
z(T+) = z(T¡) for z 2 fls;¿;ldg (A88)
The predetermined variables ls and ld behave continuously both at the time of anticipation
and implementation, while the jump variable ¿ jumps at the time of anticipation but
behaves sluggishly at time T. From equation (A87) we get the conditions
0 = A0 + A1 + A2 (A89)













= (A0 ¡ e A0)h10er0T + A1h11er1T + (A2 ¡ e A2)h12er2T (A93)
d¿ = (A0 ¡ e A0)h20er0T + A1h21er1T + (A2 ¡ e A2)h22er2T (A94)
dl
d
= (A0 ¡ e A0)er0T + A1er1T + (A2 ¡ e A2)er2T (A95)








+ (h10 ¡ h12)d¿ (A96)
+ (h12h20 ¡ h10h22)dl
d
¶







+ (h12 ¡ h11)d¿ (A97)
+ (h11h22 ¡ h21h12)dl
d
¶







+ (h11 ¡ h10)d¿ (A98)




d = h10(h21 ¡ h22) + h11(h22 ¡ h20) + h12(h20 ¡ h21) (A99)
From the bounded solution (A81) of the state vector (ls;¿;ld)0 the equation for the sta-
ble saddlepath can be obtained by eliminating e A0er0t and e A2er2t. The equation for the
63Cf. Turnovsky (2000) and Clausen and Wohltmann (2005).
56convergent saddlepath is then given by the hyperplane
(h12h20 ¡ h10h22)(ld ¡ l
d
) + (h22 ¡ h20)(ls ¡ l
s
) + (h10 ¡ h12)(¿ ¡ ¿) = 0 (A100)




)0 can be obtained from equation (A79) by
¯rst eliminating A1er1t and A2er2t and then setting the term belonging to A0er0t equal to
zero (since this term vanishes if t approaches in¯nity). The unstable saddlepath is then








)+(h11¡h12)(¿¡¿) = 0 (A101)
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_ p; _ p¤

























in a phase diagram
For t > T the development of the state vector (ls ¡ l
s
1;¿ ¡ ¿1;ld ¡ l
d
1)0 can be represented

































_ pc; _ p¤c
_ p; _ p¤
























1)0 for t > T
towards its steady state (0;0;0) (bold dot) represented by a trajectory (solid line) on the stable
hyperplane
57B Domestic-Currency Denominated Oil Imports
Next consider the state space and steady state representation of the world system if raw
materials imports are denominated in terms of domestic rather than foreign currency. The
di®erence system is now given by the equations
¸(q ¡ q¤) = 2c0 + g ¡ g¤ ¡ a2id
r ¡ (2c3 ¡ (a1 ¡ 2c1)Ã¤)¿ (B1)
+ (a1 ¡ 2c1)(Ã ¡ Ã¤)(p ¡ pR)
y ¡ y¤ = q ¡ q¤ + Ã¤¿ + (Ã ¡ Ã¤)(p ¡ pR) (B2)
ld = (® + ®¤ ¡ 2)¿ + l1(q ¡ q¤) (B3)
+ l2 _ ¿ + l2_ ld ¡ l2( _ m ¡ _ m¤)


















( _ m ¡ _ p)
+
¯¤








(_ p ¡ _ pR)




_ ls + _ ld
¶
+ _ m ¡ _ pR (B5)
q ¡ q¤ = f0 ¡ f¤
0 + (f1 + f¤
1 + f¤
2)¿ (B6)
+ (f2 ¡ f¤
2)(p ¡ pR)









+ m ¡ pR (B7)
The corresponding aggregate system is given by the following set of equations:
(1 ¡ a1)(q + q¤) = 2a0 ¡ a2is
r + g + g¤ ¡ 2d0a1 ¡ a1Ã¤¿ (B8)
+ a1(Ã + Ã¤)(p ¡ pR)
y + y¤ = q + q¤ ¡ Ã¤¿ + (Ã + Ã¤)(p ¡ pR) ¡ 2d0 (B9)
ls = (® ¡ ®¤)¿ + 2l0 + l1(q + q¤) ¡ l2(2i¤ + _ e) (B10)








































(_ p ¡ _ pR)
q + q¤ = f0 + f¤
0 + (f1 ¡ f¤
1 ¡ f¤
2)¿ + (f2 + f¤
2)(p ¡ pR) (B12)
The dynamics of the di®erence system and the aggregate system can be represented by
the equations (cf. (A9), (A10), (A21))
µ
¸^ ·1 + a2(1 ¡ (® + ®¤))
¶

























_ ld + ¸(q ¡ q¤) + ¸·2( _ m ¡ _ pR) =
2c0 + g ¡ g¤ ¡ (2c3 ¡ (a1 ¡ 2c1)Ã¤)¿ ¡
1
2




(a1 ¡ 2c1)(Ã ¡ Ã¤)ld + (a1 ¡ 2c1)(Ã ¡ Ã¤)(m ¡ pR)



























_ ls ¡ l2( _ m ¡ _ m¤) + l1(q ¡ q¤)
+ l1·2( _ m ¡ _ pR) = ld + (2 ¡ ® ¡ ®¤)¿
µ









a2l1 + l2(1 ¡ a1)
¶
^ ·5_ ld
+ (a2l1 + l2(1 ¡ a1))·6( _ m ¡ _ pR) + (a2l1 + l2(1 ¡ a1))(q + q¤)


















ld + l2(g + g¤)










































and ·2, ·4 and ·6 are de¯ned in (A14), (A23) and (A25) respectively. The matrix repre-























^ b11 = (a2l1 + l2(1 ¡ a1))·4 + a2l2 = b11 (B20)
^ b12 = (a2l1 + l2(1 ¡ a1))^ ·3 ¡ a2l2(® ¡ ®¤) (B21)
^ b13 = (a2l1 + l2(1 ¡ a1))^ ·5 (B22)













^ b22 = ¸^ ·1 + a2(1 ¡ (® + ®¤)) (B24)


























^ b32 = l1^ ·1 + l2 (B27)













^ c11 = a2 ¡
1
2
l2a1(Ã + Ã¤) = c11 (B29)
^ c12 = ¡l2a1Ã¤ ¡ a2(® ¡ ®¤) (B30)
^ c13 = ¡
1
2
l2a1(Ã + Ã¤) (B31)
^ c21 = ¡
1
2
(a1 ¡ 2c1)(Ã ¡ Ã¤) = c21 (B32)
^ c22 = ¡(2c3 ¡ (a1 ¡ 2c1)Ã¤) (B33)
^ c23 = ¡
1
2
(a1 ¡ 2c1)(Ã ¡ Ã¤) (B34)
^ c31 = 0 = c31 (B35)
^ c32 = 2 ¡ (® + ®¤) = c32 (B36)
^ c33 = 1 = c33 (B37)
60The steady state system that results from (B13), (B14) and (B15) by inserting the steady


















2)(pR ¡ m) ¡ ¸·2( _ m ¡ _ pR) + g ¡ g¤ + 2c0 + ¸(f¤
0 ¡ f0)
¡ (2c3 ¡ (a1 ¡ 2c1)Ã¤)¿ ¡
1
2





(a1 ¡ 2c1)(Ã ¡ Ã¤)l
d
+ (a1 ¡ 2c1)(Ã ¡ Ã¤)(m ¡ pR)
l
d
+ (2 ¡ ® ¡ ®¤)¿ = ¡l2( _ m ¡ _ m¤) + l1·2( _ m ¡ _ pR) (B39)
+ l1(f1 + f¤
1 + f¤
2)¿ + l1(f0 ¡ f¤
0)













+ m ¡ pR
¶

















+ m ¡ pR
¶
(B40)
+ f0 + f¤
0 + ·6( _ m ¡ _ pR)
¾
= 2a0l2 ¡ 2l0a2 ¡ 2d0a1l2 + a2l2( _ m + _ m¤)















+ l2(g + g¤)
+ l2a1(Ã + Ã¤)(m ¡ pR)





^ f11 ^ f12 ^ f13
^ f21 ^ f22 ^ f23

























^ f11 = ¸(f1 + f¤
1 + f¤
2) + 2c3 ¡ (a1 ¡ 2c1)Ã¤ (B42)





2) ¡ (a1 ¡ 2c1)(Ã ¡ Ã¤)
¶
= ¡f12 (B43)
^ f13 = ^ f12 (B44)
^ f21 = 2 ¡ ® ¡ ®¤ ¡ l1(f1 + f¤
1 + f¤
2) = f21 (B45)









2) = f23 (B47)











^ f33 = a2 + ^ f32 (B50)
The determinant j^ Fj of the matrix ^ F = ( ^ fij)1·i;j·3 is given by
j^ Fj = ^ f11 ^ f32 ¡ ^ f12 ^ f31 + a2( ^ f11 ^ f22 ¡ ^ f12 ^ f21) (B51)

















^ f22a2 + ^ f32 ¡ ^ f12a2 ¡ ^ f12
^ f23 ^ f31 ¡ ^ f21 ^ f33 ^ f11 ^ f33 ¡ ^ f12 ^ f31 ^ f12 ^ f21 ¡ ^ f11 ^ f23





























































































( ^ f11 ¡ 2 ^ f12) =
a2
j^ Fj













(2 ^ f12f1 + ^ f11f2) = ¡
a2
j^ Fj

















(2 ^ f12 ¡ ^ f11)f¤

















, ^ f11(f2 ¡ f¤
2) > ¡2 ^ f12(f1 + f¤
1 + f¤
2) (B62)
, ^ f11(f2 ¡ f¤
2) > 2f12(f1 + f¤
1 + f¤
2)
, (f2 ¡ f¤
2)
¡
2c3 ¡ (a1 ¡ 2c1)Ã¤¢
+ (a1 ¡ 2c1)(Ã ¡ Ã¤)(f1 + f¤
1 + f¤
2) > 0
Since f2 > f¤
2 and Ã > Ã¤ by assumption inequality (B62) is met if inequality (A77) holds.
63C Combination of the Two Polar Cases
We have as yet discussed the two polar cases that raw materials imports are either com-
pletely denominated in terms of the foreign or the domestic currency. Let us now consider
a combination of these two cases. The dynamic price equations are then of the form (26),
(27) so that the dynamic supply functions that result from the price-wage equations can
be written as follows:
































(1 ¡ ¹)(1 ¡ °)
¹±
( _ m ¡ _ pR) +
(1 ¡ ¹)°
¹±
( _ m¤ ¡ _ p¤
R)































¹¤±¤ ( _ m¤ ¡ _ p¤
R) +
(1 ¡ ¹¤)(1 ¡ °¤)
¹¤±¤ ( _ m ¡ _ pR)
The income equations (9), (10) have to be replaced by the equations
y = q ¡ Ã
¡
°(p¤
R + e ¡ p) + (1 ¡ °)(pR ¡ p)
¢
¡ d0 (C3)
= q + Ã°¿ ¡ Ã°(p¤
R ¡ p¤) ¡ Ã(1 ¡ °)(pR ¡ p) ¡ d0
y¤ = q¤ ¡ Ã¤¡
°¤(p¤
R ¡ p¤) + (1 ¡ °¤)(pR ¡ e ¡ p¤)
¢
¡ d0 (C4)
= q¤ ¡ (1 ¡ °¤)Ã¤¿ ¡ Ã¤°¤(p¤
R ¡ p¤) ¡ (1 ¡ °¤)Ã¤(pR ¡ p) ¡ d0
The di®erence system is then given by
¸(q ¡ q¤) = 2c0 + g ¡ g¤ ¡ a2(1 ¡ (® + ®¤))_ ¿ (C5)
+
µ














(a1 ¡ 2c1)(Ã ¡ Ã¤)ls
+ (a1 ¡ 2c1)(Ã° ¡ Ã¤°¤)(m¤ ¡ p¤
R)
+ (a1 ¡ 2c1)
¡
Ã(1 ¡ °) ¡ Ã¤(1 ¡ °¤)
¢
(m ¡ pR)
64y ¡ y¤ = q ¡ q¤ +
¡










Ã(1 ¡ °) ¡ Ã¤(1 ¡ °¤)
¢
(pR ¡ p)
ld + (2 ¡ (® + ®¤))¿ = l1(q ¡ q¤) + l2 _ ¿ + l2_ ld ¡ l2( _ m ¡ _ m¤) (C7)














(1 ¡ ¯¤)(1 ¡ ®¤) +














































(1 ¡ ¹)(1 ¡ °)
¹±
¡
(1 ¡ ¹¤)(1 ¡ °¤)
¹¤±¤
¾









( _ m¤ ¡ _ p¤
R)
where the long run supply functions are de¯ned by
q = f0 + f1¿ + f2
µ
°(p ¡ (p¤
R + e)) + (1 ¡ °)(p ¡ pR)
¶
(C9)
= f0 + (f1 + f2°)¿ + f2
µ
°(p¤ ¡ p¤
R) + (1 ¡ °)(p ¡ pR)
¶
























































2(1 ¡ °¤)(m ¡ pR)
65so that
q ¡ q¤ = f0 ¡ f¤
0 +
µ
f1 + f2° + f¤





















f2(1 ¡ °) ¡ f¤
2(1 ¡ °¤)
¶






The corresponding aggregate system is given by the following equations:
(1 ¡ a1)(q + q¤) = a1
¡





R ¡ p¤) (C12)
¡ a1
¡
Ã(1 ¡ °) + Ã¤(1 ¡ °¤)
¢
(pR ¡ p)
+ 2a0 ¡ 2d0a1 + g + g¤ ¡ a2(2i¤ + _ e)
+ a2
¡
(® ¡ ®¤)_ ¿ ¡ _ ls + _ m + _ m¤¢
y + y¤ = q + q¤ +
¡





R ¡ p¤) (C13)
¡
¡
Ã(1 ¡ °) + Ã¤(1 ¡ °¤)
¢
(pR ¡ p) ¡ 2d0
ls = (® ¡ ®¤)¿ + 2l0 + l1(q + q¤) ¡ l2(2i¤ + _ e) (C14)














(1 ¡ ¯¤)(1 ¡ ®¤) +














































(1 ¡ ¹)(1 ¡ °)
¹±
+
(1 ¡ ¹¤)(1 ¡ °¤)
¹¤±¤
¾









( _ m¤ ¡ _ p¤
R)
66q + q¤ = f0 + f¤
0 +
µ
f1 + f2° ¡ f¤


















































(1 ¡ ¯¤)(1 ¡ ®¤) +


























































The di®erence and the sum of the dynamic supply functions, i.e. equations (C7) and (C15)
respectively, can then be written in the following short form:










+ (º4 ¡ º¤
4)( _ m ¡ _ pR) + (º5 ¡ º¤
5)( _ m¤ ¡ _ p¤
R)










+ (º4 + º¤
4)( _ m ¡ _ pR) + (º5 + º¤
5)( _ m¤ ¡ _ p¤
R)
67Substituting (C27) for q¡q¤ in the IS and LM equation (C5) and (C7) respectively yields
the dynamic state equations for the di®erence system:
µ
¸(º1 + º¤











3)_ ld + ¸(º4 ¡ º¤
4)( _ m ¡ _ pR)
+ ¸(º5 ¡ º¤
5)( _ m¤ ¡ _ p¤
R) + ¸(q ¡ q¤) =
2c0 + g ¡ g¤ +
µ



















+ (a1 ¡ 2c1)
µ
Ã(1 ¡ °) ¡ Ã¤(1 ¡ °¤)
¶
(m ¡ pR)
ld + (2 ¡ (® + ®¤))¿ = l1(q ¡ q¤) +
µ

















+ l1(º4 ¡ º¤
4)( _ m ¡ _ pR) + l1(º5 ¡ º¤
5)( _ m¤ ¡ _ p¤
R)
¡ l2( _ m ¡ _ m¤)
The dynamic equation of motion of the aggregate system results from the combination of
the IS and LM equation (C12), (C14) and then substituting the aggregate supply function
68(C28) for q + q¤:
½¡
a2l1 + l2(1 ¡ a1)
¢
(º1 ¡ º¤





























a2l1 + l2(1 ¡ a1)
¢
(º4 + º¤
4)( _ m ¡ _ pR)
+
¡
a2l1 + l2(1 ¡ a1)
¢
(º5 + º¤




a2l1 + l2(1 ¡ a1)
¢
(q + q¤) =
a2l2( _ m + _ m¤) + l2(g + g¤) + 2a0l2 ¡ 2d0a1l2 ¡ 2l0a2
+
µ


























Ã(1 ¡ °) + Ã¤(1 ¡ °¤)
¶
(m ¡ pR)
The matrix representation of the dynamic state equations (C29), (C30), (C31) in devia-






















where the matrices B = (bij)1·i;j·3 and C = (cij)1·i;j·3 are de¯ned by
b11 =
¡











a2l1 + l2(1 ¡ a1)
¢
(º1 ¡ º¤














b22 = ¸(º1 + º¤
1) + a2
¡













b32 = l2 + l1(º1 + º¤
1) (C40)





69c11 = a2 ¡
1
2
l2a1(Ã + Ã¤) (C42)
c12 = l2a1
¡
Ã° ¡ Ã¤(1 ¡ °¤)
¢












(a1 ¡ 2c1)(Ã ¡ Ã¤) (C45)
c22 = ¡2c3 + (a1 ¡ 2c1)
¡








Ã(2° ¡ 1) ¡ Ã¤(2°¤ ¡ 1)
¢
(C47)
c31 = 0 (C48)
c32 = 2 ¡ (® + ®¤) (C49)
c33 = 1 (C50)
In the special case ° = °¤ = 1, i.e., if raw materials imports are completely denominated
in terms of the foreign currency, (C32) is equivalent to the dynamic system (A27). In the
other polar case ° = °¤ = 0 it is equivalent to (B19).
The steady state system that results from the dynamic state equations and the long
run supply functions is given by the following equations:
¸
µ
f1 + f2° + f¤


































R) + ¸(º4 ¡ º¤
4)( _ m ¡ _ pR)
+ ¸(º5 ¡ º¤
5)( _ m¤ ¡ _ p¤
R) =
µ















(a1 ¡ 2c1)(Ã ¡ Ã¤)l
s
+ 2c0 + g ¡ g¤






+ (a1 ¡ 2c1)
µ





+ (2 ¡ (® + ®¤))¿ = l1
µ
f1 + f2° + f¤










































( _ m¤ ¡ _ p¤
R) ¡ l2( _ m ¡ _ m¤) + l1(f0 ¡ f¤
0)
¡





f1 + f2° ¡ f¤





















f2(1 ¡ °) + f¤
2(1 ¡ °¤)
¶







+ (º4 + º¤
4)( _ m ¡ _ pR) + (º5 + º¤









Ã° ¡ Ã¤(1 ¡ °¤)
¢





























Ã(1 ¡ °) + Ã¤(1 ¡ °¤)
¶
(m ¡ pR)
We consider the case of a simultaneous increase of the US-dollar and Euro price of imported
crude oil, i.e. dp¤































f11 = ¸(f1 + f2° + f¤
1 + (1 ¡ °¤)f¤
2) (C55)
+ 2c3 ¡ (a1 ¡ 2c1)
¡

























(a1 ¡ 2c1)(Ã ¡ Ã¤) (C57)
f21 = 2 ¡ ® ¡ ®¤ ¡ l1
¡
f1 + f2° + f¤




















Ã° ¡ Ã¤(1 ¡ °¤)
¢
¡ a2(® ¡ ®¤) (C61)
¡
¡
a2l1 + l2(1 ¡ a1)
¢¡
f1 + f2° ¡ f¤














a2l1 + l2(1 ¡ a1)
¢¡
f2(2° ¡ 1) + f¤
2(2°¤ ¡ 1)
¢¾




l2a1(Ã + Ã¤) ¡
¡






and f12, f23 and f32 are de¯ned in (A53), (A57) and (A59) respectively.
Note that system (C54) is equivalent to the steady state system (A51) if ° = °¤ = 1
and equivalent to (B41) if ° = °¤ = 0. Since
f12 = f13 + º1 (C64)
f22 = 1 + f23 + º2 (C65)
f32 = f33 ¡ a2 + º3 (C66)
where
º1 = ¸(f2° ¡ f¤
2°¤) ¡ (a1 ¡ 2c1)(Ã° ¡ Ã¤°¤) (C67)
º2 = ¡l1(f2° ¡ f¤
2°¤) (C68)
º3 = l2a1(Ã° + Ã¤°¤) ¡
¡




the determinant jFj of the system matrix F = (fij)1·i;j·3 in (C54) is given by
jFj = f11f33 ¡ f13f31 + a2(f11f23 ¡ f13f21) (C70)
+ º1(f23f31 ¡ f21f33) + º2(f11f33 ¡ f13f31)
+ º3(f13f21 ¡ f11f23)
72jFj coincides with j^ Fj if ° = °¤ = 0 and equals jFj if ° = °¤ = 1. The steady state system































f23f31 ¡ f21f33 f11f33 ¡ f13f31 f13f21 ¡ f11f23
f21f32 ¡ f31f22 f12f31 ¡ f11f32 f11f22 ¡ f21f12
1
C C














f33 = a2 ¡ f32 (C72)
f23 = f23 (C73)































2f12 + l1(a1 ¡ 2c1)(f2Ã¤ ¡ f¤
2Ã)(°¤ ¡ °)
¶
In the special case ° = °¤ the multiplier (C75) reduces to 2a2f12=jFj which is positive if
f12 > 0, i.e., if ¸(f2 ¡ f¤
2) > (a1 ¡ 2c1)(Ã ¡ Ã¤) holds (cf. (A68)).64 The determinant
(C70) simpli¯es in the case ° = °¤ to
jFj°=°¤ = ¡f11f32 + f12f31 + a2(f11f22 ¡ f21f12) (C76)
since
f12º2 + f23º1 = f12º3 ¡ f32º1 = f23º3 + f32º2 = 0 (C77)
if ° = °¤.
64Note that the multiplier (C75) also equals 2a2f12=jFj if the term f2Ã
¤ coincides with f
¤
2Ã which is met if
both ¾ = ¾
¤ and ± = ±
¤ holds.
73D Stabilization Policies in Case of Foreign-Currency De-
nominated Oil Imports
D.1 Complete Stabilization of the Consumer In°ation Rate
The formal solution of the state vector, i.e. equations (A80), (A81), and the determination
of the constants A0, A1, A2, e A0, e A2 (cf. (A91) to (A98)) remain unchanged if the rate
of change of the domestic money supply is endogenized according to the monetary policy
rule







If this rule holds both for 0 < t < T and t > T it guarantees _ pc = 0 for all t > 0. Since _ m is
now a function of the rate of change of the three state variables, this leads to adjustments
of the elements bij of the state matrix B in (A27). The state equation (A9) is independent
of _ m, while the equations (A10) and (A21) contain the variable _ m; the matrix B in (A27)
has therefore to be replaced by e B = (e bij) where




e b12 = b12 ¡ a2l2(1 ¡ ®) (D3)




e b21 = b21 (D5)
e b22 = b22 (D6)
e b23 = b23 (D7)




e b32 = b32 ¡ l2(1 ¡ ®) (D9)




The complete stabilization of the foreign consumer in°ation rate _ p¤c with the aid of foreign
monetary policy leads to the decision rule







which implies _ p¤c = 0 for all t > 0. The matrices B and C of the state equations (A27)
have now to be replaced by B0 = (b0
ij) and C0 = (c0
ij) where65
b0











12 = b12 + a2l2(1 ¡ ®¤) ¡ (1 ¡ ®¤)
¡
a2l1 + l2(1 ¡ a1)
¢
·6 (D13)
65Note that in the case of foreign-currency denominated oil imports the equations (A9) and (A21) depend














R. If _ m
¤ is de¯ned by (D11) the
foreign money supply m
¤ is also an endogenous variable where the policy rule for m
¤ results from (D11)
by integration. This implies that both state matrices B and C change their structure.
74b0
















22 = b22 ¡ ¸·2(1 ¡ ®¤) (D16)
b0





31 = b31 +
1
2
(l2 + l1·2) (D18)
b0
32 = b32 ¡ (l2 + l1·2)(1 ¡ ®¤) (D19)
b0
33 = b33 ¡
1
2
(l2 + l1·2) (D20)
c0
11 = c11 +
1
2
l2a1(Ã + Ã¤) = a2 (D21)
c0
12 = c12 ¡ l2a1(Ã + Ã¤)(1 ¡ ®¤) (D22)
c0
13 = c13 ¡
1
2
l2a1(Ã + Ã¤) = 0 (D23)
c0
21 = c21 +
1
2
(a1 ¡ 2c1)(Ã ¡ Ã¤) = 0 (D24)
c0
22 = c22 ¡ (a1 ¡ 2c1)(Ã ¡ Ã¤)(1 ¡ ®¤) (D25)
c0
23 = c23 ¡
1
2
(a1 ¡ 2c1)(Ã ¡ Ã¤) = 0 (D26)
c0
31 = c31 (D27)
c0
32 = c32 (D28)
c0
33 = c33 (D29)
In the case of a simultaneous stabilization of the in°ation rates _ pc and _ p¤c with the help
of the policy rules (D1) and (D11) the state matrices B and C have to be replaced by
B00 = e B + B0 ¡ B = (b00
ij) and C0 respectively, where
b00








12 = b12 + a2l2(® ¡ ®¤) ¡ (1 ¡ ®¤)
¡


















22 = b22 ¡ ¸·2(1 ¡ ®¤) = b0
22 (D34)
b00











32 = b32 ¡ l2(1 ¡ ®) ¡ (l2 + l1·2)(1 ¡ ®¤) (D37)
b00




Note that the endogenization of domestic and foreign growth rate of money supply ac-
cording to the policy rules (D1) and (D11) does not result in dynamic instability. Several
numerical simulations illustrate that the saddle point stability continuous to hold, but the
75unstable eigenvalue r1 increases by a large amount. The strongest rise of r1 takes place if
the domestic and foreign consumer in°ation rate are pegged simultaneously at their initial
steady state level at all times by utilizing (D1) and (D11).
D.2 Stabilization of the Consumer In°ation Rate for t > T
A change in the determination of the constants A1, e A0 and e A2 takes place, if the monetary
policy rule (D1) only holds for t > T and is credible announced in t = 0. This implies
_ pc =0 for t > T but _ pc 6= 0 for 0 < t < T. In this case the formal solution of the state
vector x = (ls;¿;ld)0 is given by
x = x0 + A0
0h0er0t + A0
1h1er1t + A0
2h2er2t for 0 < t < T (D39)
x = x1 + e A0
0e h0ee r0t + e A0
2e h2ee r2t for t > T (D40)
where r0, r1, r2 are the eigenvalues and h0, h1, h2 the corresponding eigenvectors of the
matrix G = B¡1C (cf. (A82)), while e r0 and e r2 are the stable eigenvalues and e h0 and e h2























1 + e A0
0e h10ee r0T + e A0




2h22er2T = ¿1 + e A0
0e h20ee r0T + e A0








1 + e A0
0ee r0T + e A0
2ee r2T (D45)
















Á1 ¡e h10ee r0T ¡e h12ee r2T
Á2 ¡e h20ee r0T ¡e h22ee r2T



























66Note that if the foreign monetary policy rule (D11) holds for t > T (which implies _ p
¤c = 0 for t > T), then
e G has to be replaced by G
0 = B
0¡1C
0. If the policy rules (D1) and (D11) hold simultaneously for t > T
































(e h20 ¡ e h22)dl
s








(Á2 ¡ Á3e h22)dl
s








(¡Á2 + Á3e h20)dl
s




¤ = Á1(e h20 ¡ e h22) + Á2(e h12 ¡ e h10) + Á3(e h10e h22 ¡ e h12e h20) (D55)
Note that ¤ is independent of the stable eigenvalues e r0 and e r2 of the stabilized system.
Since the same holds for the constant A0
1 the initial jump of ¿ does not depend on the
eigenvalues e r0 and e r2:















D.3 Complete System Stabilization
Next consider the problem of complete system stabilization, i.e.
x = x0 for 0 · t < T (D57)
and
x = x1 for t > T (D58)
where x is an arbitrary endogenous variable and x0 denotes its initial and x1 its new steady
state level. Dynamic adjustment processes which result from anticipated oil price shocks
can be avoided if domestic and foreign monetary policy is able to set the constants A1,
e A0 and e A2 equal to zero (cf. (A96), (A97), (A98)). If A1 = 0 then, according to (A91),
(A92), A0 = A2 = 0 so that the state vector and the other endogenous variables are ¯xed
at their respective initial steady state level during the whole anticipation phase 0 · t < T
(cf. (A80)). If e A0 and e A2 can be set equal to zero simultaneously then (D58) holds for
all endogenous variable (cf. (A81)). The constants A1, e A0 and e A2 depend on the steady
state change of the state variables, i.e. dl
s
, d¿ and dl
d
. In the presence of active monetary









d _ m +
@z





where the multipliers @z
@ _ m are de¯ned in (A63), (A64). In the case of passive foreign
monetary policy the steady state multipliers @z
@p¤
R are de¯ned in (A68), (A69) and (A70).
Complete system stabilization requires a permanent change of the foreign monetary growth
rate (d _ m¤ 6= 0). We must therefore determine the steady state multipliers of foreign
monetary policy. A permanent increase in foreign money stock leads to a permanent rise
in foreign price level so that { given a ¯xed level of the US dollar price of imported raw
materials { no steady state level of the foreign real factor price p¤
R ¡ p¤ exists. Instead,
it would decline continuously if d _ m¤ > 0 holds. In order to guarantee the existence of
p¤
R ¡ p¤ we must give up the assumption that there is no growth in the factor price p¤
R
(i.e., d_ p¤
R = 0). We therefore endogenize _ p¤
R according to the pricing rule
_ p¤
R = _ m¤ (D60)
or
_ p¤
R = _ p¤ (D61)
In the ¯rst case the state space dynamics, represented by the matrices B and C in (A27),
do not change, while in the second case equation (A8) can be omitted so that the matrices





























































b32 = b32 (D69)










78c11 = a2 (D71)
c12 = c12 (D72)
c13 = 0 (D73)
c21 = 0 (D74)
c22 = c22 (D75)
c23 = 0 (D76)
c31 = c31 = 0 (D77)
c32 = c32 = 2 ¡ (® + ®¤) (D78)
c33 = c33 = 1 (D79)
The steady state multipliers of _ m¤ are dependent upon the chosen endogenization of _ p¤
R.
If _ p¤
R = _ m¤ holds, the F-matrix in (A51) does not change, and the long run multipliers of





















Ad _ m¤ (D80)
It then follows (cf. (A62))
d¿
d _ m¤ = ¡
2f12a2l2
jFj
< 0 (if f12 > 0) (D81)
dl
d























d _ m¤ =
d(m¤ ¡ p¤)
d _ m¤ (D85)
d(p¤
R + e ¡ p)
d _ m¤ = ¡
d¿
d _ m¤ +
d(p¤
R ¡ p¤)
d _ m¤ =
a2l2
jFj
(2f12 ¡ f11) (D86)
dq
d _ m¤ = (f1 + f2)
d¿
d _ m¤ ¡ f2
d(p¤
R ¡ p¤)





¡ 2f12(f1 + f2) + f2f11)
dq¤
d _ m¤ = ¡f¤
1
d¿












79In contrast to domestic monetary policy foreign monetary policy is e±cient in the long
run if the raw materials pricing rule _ p¤
R = _ m¤ holds.
In case _ p¤











































The determinant jFj equals a2f11 which is in general smaller than the determinant of the
original F-matrix (cf. (A51)):
jFj < jFj (D91)























































¡ 2f23 = ¡
2
f11















(f11f32 ¡ f12f31) ¡
1
f11
































































































@ _ m¤ = 0 for x 2 fp¤
R ¡ p¤ ;p¤
R + e ¡ p;q ;q¤g (D107)
Foreign monetary policy has now the same classical properties as domestic monetary
policy. Since jFj < jFj holds in general, the contractionary steady state output e®ects of
an oil price shock are increased, if the raw materials pricing rule _ p¤
R = _ m¤ is replaced by
the pricing equation _ p¤
R = _ p¤ (cf. (A75), (A76)).
Complete system stabilization requires the neutralization of the anticipation e®ects of
an announced increase of the US dollar price of imported raw materials, i.e. A1 = 0.
According to (A96) this is the case if the domestic central bank credibly announces the
following change of the growth rate of money supply to take e®ect at the date T of
realization of the oil price shock:

























In case of the pricing rule _ p¤
R = _ m¤ the steady state multipliers of p¤
R are of the form
(A68), (A69) and (A70), while in case _ p¤
R = _ p¤ they have to be replaced by (D93), (D94)
and (D95). If _ p¤
R = _ m¤ holds, the components hij (i = 1;2) belong to the eigenvectors
hj (j = 0;2) of the matrix G = B¡1C (cf. (A82)) while in case _ p¤
R = _ p¤ they result
from the matrix G = B¡1C, where the matrices B and C are de¯ned by (D62) to (D79).
Numerical simulations show that d _ mann: changes sign, if the materials pricing rule _ p¤
R = _ m¤
is replaced by _ p¤
R = _ p¤:
d _ mann:j _ p¤
R= _ m¤ < 0 < d _ mann:j _ p¤
R= _ p¤ (D109)
The reason is that in case _ p¤
R = _ m¤ the anticipation of a future increase of the US dollar
price of oil leads on impact to a fall in ¿, i.e., ¿(0+) < ¿0, while just the opposite holds,
i.e. ¿(0+) > ¿0, if _ p¤
R = _ p¤. The neutralization of the anticipation e®ects of a future oil
price increase therefore requires the credible announcement of a contractionary domestic
81monetary policy, if _ p¤
R = _ m¤ holds, i.e, d _ mann: < 0, while d _ mann: must be positive in
case _ p¤
R = _ p¤. Instead of the announcement of an expansionary domestic monetary policy,
which may result in time inconsistency problems (since d _ mrealized is always negative), the
stabilization condition A1 = 0 in case _ p¤
R = _ p¤ can also be realized with the help of the
following announced foreign monetary policy (which is negative in general):

























If this policy is credible, it leads on impact to a fall of the domestic terms of trade ¿ so
that a jump in ¿ can be prevented.
As long as the above reaction of domestic or foreign monetary policy in T is considered
credible and therefore anticipated by the private sector all endogenous variables remain up
to T in their initial respective steady state position. A complete stabilization in the period
after the occurrence of the oil price shock, i.e. the removal of any adjustment dynamics
for t > T, requires an unanticipated deviation from the announced monetary policy and a
sudden and simultaneous implementation of a growth rate of domestic and foreign money
supply such that
e A0 = e A2 = 0 (D111)
holds (cf. (A81)). In the case of unanticipated exogenous shocks we have to set T = 0 in



























k1 = (h12 ¡ h11)(h22 ¡ h20) ¡ (h21 ¡ h22)(h10 ¡ h12) (D114)
= ¡
¡
(h11 ¡ h10)(h22 ¡ h20) ¡ (h10 ¡ h12)(h20 ¡ h21)
¢
k2 = (h12 ¡ h11)(h12h20 ¡ h10h22) ¡ (h10 ¡ h12)(h11h22 ¡ h21h12) (D115)
k3 = (h11 ¡ h10)(h12h20 ¡ h10h22) ¡ (h10 ¡ h12)(h10h21 ¡ h11h20) (D116)
In case T = 0 the constants e A0 and e A2 only depend on the steady state change of the
state variables ls and ld, i.e. are independent of d¿. Since in general k2 6= ¡k3 holds, the
67Note that the realization of dp
¤
R > 0 in T leads to dynamic adjustments that are equivalent to an unantic-
ipated increase of p
¤
R. The reason is that without active monetary policy in T the state vector must jump
at time T from the initial steady state on the new stable saddle path in oder to guarantee a convergent
adjustment process (cf. (A100)). The jump in T then coincides with the initial jump of the forward-looking















simultaneously. First consider this stabilization condition under the pricing rule _ p¤











































where the multipliers @l
s
@ _ m¤ and @l
d
@ _ m¤ are de¯ned in (D83) and (D82) respectively, while the
corresponding steady state multipliers of p¤
R are given in (A70) and (A69). Solving (D119)





































where the determinant e ¢ is given by
















We then get the following monetary policy reaction functions:
d _ mj _ p¤






























































































83d _ m¤j _ p¤

































R < 0 if jFj > a2f11 = jFj
Generally d _ mj _ p¤
R= _ m¤ < 0 holds where
¯








i.e. the realized domestic monetary policy at time T is stronger restrictive than the one
announced.
In case _ p¤


































R de¯ned by (D95) and (D94) respectively. It follows
d _ mj _ p¤





























(f12f31 ¡ f11f32) + (f21f12 + f23f11)
¶
d _ m¤j _ p¤















Just as the domestic monetary policy rule the following relationship holds between the
announced and actually realized foreign monetary policy:
¯ ¯








Obviously, the foreign monetary policy rules d _ m¤j _ p¤
R= _ m¤ and d _ m¤j _ p¤
R= _ p¤ coincide. Note
that the same holds for the domestic monetary reaction functions, i.e.,
d _ mj _ p¤
R= _ m¤ = d _ mj _ p¤
R= _ p¤ (D129)
84since d _ mj _ p¤
R= _ m¤ can be rewritten in the following form:
d _ mj _ p¤




























(f12f21 + f23f11) +
l2
jFj
(a2f11 ¡ jFj) ¢
¢
µ
f11(a2 ¡ f32) + f12f31 + a2
¡









2f11(f12f21 + f23f11) + (a2f11 ¡ jFj) ¢
¢
µ









2f11(f12f21 + (1 ¡ f22)f11) + (a2f11 ¡ jFj) ¢
¢
µ









2f11(f12f21 ¡ f11f22) ¡ a2f11jFj ¡ jFj2












































(f12f31 ¡ f11f32) + f12f21 + f11f23
¾
dp¤
R = d _ mj _ p¤
R= _ p¤
In case _ p¤
R = _ m¤ foreign monetary policy has long run real e®ects while it is neutral if
_ p¤
R = _ p¤ holds. Since complete system stabilization requires d _ m¤ < 0 the contractionary
steady state output e®ects of dp¤
R > 0 are reinforced if the pricing rule _ p¤
R = _ m¤ is assumed.
Moreover, the total output e®ects under both materials pricing rules are identical:
dxj _ p¤
















d _ m¤ (D131)
= dxj _ p¤









R for x 2 fq;q¤g
This result holds, since the total steady state change of the terms of trade and the real
85factor prices does not depend on the chosen endogenization of _ p¤
R:
d¿j _ p¤





































































R= _ m¤ + d(m¤ ¡ p¤)
¯ ¯
_ p¤















































R + e ¡ p)
¯ ¯
_ p¤
R= _ m¤ = ¡ d¿j _ p¤


















According to equations (17) and (18) it follows that
dqj _ p¤
R= _ m¤ = dqj _ p¤
R= _ p¤ (D135)
and
dq¤j _ p¤
R= _ m¤ = dq¤j _ p¤
R= _ p¤ (D136)
must hold. Since d _ mj _ p¤
R= _ m¤ = d _ mj _ p¤
R= _ p¤ and d _ m¤j _ p¤
R= _ m¤ = d _ m¤j _ p¤
R= _ p¤ so that { in
addition {
dxj _ p¤
R= _ m¤ = dxj _ p¤
R= _ p¤ (D137)
for x 2
©
_ p; _ pc; _ p¤; _ p¤c; _ e; _ w; _ w¤;i ¡ _ pc;i¤ ¡ _ p¤c;i;i
¤;y;y¤ª
holds, we can conclude that the new steady state of the completely stabilized system is
independent of the underlying pricing rule for raw materials inputs.68 Several numerical
simulations illustrate that for the realized monetary response functions
d _ m < d _ m¤ < 0 (D138)
68Analogous results hold in the case of domestic-currency denominated oil.
86holds. This implies a steady state fall of the domestic in°ation rates that is stronger than
the long run decline of the corresponding foreign rates:
d_ p = d_ pc = d _ w < d_ p¤ = d_ p¤c = d _ w¤ < 0 (D139)
The steady state change of the depreciation rate _ e must therefore be negative:
d_ e = d _ m ¡ d _ m¤ < 0 (D140)
D.4 System Stabilization for t > T
Let us ¯nally discuss the problem of complete system stabilization in the period after
the occurrence of the oil price shock, i.e. the avoidance of any adjustment dynamics
for t > T. In this case condition (D58) is required to hold while adjustment processes
during the anticipation period 0 < t < T are now admissible. Condition (D58) is met if a
coordinated and anticipated simultaneous monetary action is able to set the constants e A0
and e A2 equal to zero simultaneously (cf. (D111)). In the case of the pricing rule _ p¤
R = _ m¤
























(h22 ¡ h20)e¡r1T ¡ (h21 ¡ h22)e¡r0T (D142)











(h22 ¡ h20)e¡r1T ¡ (h20 ¡ h21)e¡r2T (D145)







(h12h20 ¡ h10h22)e¡r1T ¡ (h10h21 ¡ h11h20)e¡r2T (D147)
Note that in the special case T = 0 the constants ¸2 and ¸4 are equal to zero so that in this
case (D141) is equivalent to (D118).69 In (D141) the total change of the state variables















































@ _ m¤ + ¸2
@¿
@ _ m¤ + ¸3
@l
d




















@ _ m¤ + ¸5
@¿
@ _ m¤ + ¸6
@l
d
@ _ m¤ (D154)
Solving (D148) for d _ m and d _ m¤ leads to the monetary policy decision rules
d _ mj _ p¤





d _ m¤j _ p¤






¢¹ = ¹2¹6 ¡ ¹3¹5 (D157)
Several numerical simulations illustrate that d _ m < d _ m¤ < 0 holds (cf. (D138)). If the
decision rules (D155) and (D156) are credibly announced at t = 0 and implemented at
t = T > 0 they prevent adjustment dynamics in the period after the realization of the oil
price increase.
Similar policy rules hold in the case of the raw materials pricing rule _ p¤
R = _ p¤. The
formulas for the constants ¸1;:::;¸6 remain unchanged where now the eigenvalues and
eigenvectors are related to the matrix G = B¡1C (cf. (D62) to (D79)). The steady state
multipliers of the state variables are of the form (D93), (D94), (D95), (D102), (D103) and
(D104). This implies that the constants ¹3 and ¹6 can be simpli¯ed to ¡l2(¸1 ¡ ¸3) and
¡l2(¸4 ¡ ¸6) respectively so that the policy rules (D155) and (D156) can be rewritten in
the following form:
d _ mj _ p¤
R= _ p¤ =




d _ m¤j _ p¤
R= _ p¤ =




Note that in general d _ mj _ p¤
R= _ p¤ < d _ mj _ p¤
R= _ m¤ and d _ m¤j _ p¤
R= _ p¤ < d _ m¤j _ p¤
R= _ m¤ holds, while
equality is given if T = 0 (cf. (D129), (D130)). In comparison with the case T = 0
domestic monetary policy is now stronger contractionary under both pricing rules while
the contraction of the foreign growth rate of money supply is slightly weakened.
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